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The Box H Problem
The Box H Problem: A Justification For
Unilateral International Coercion
Owen Donald Jonest
It is clear that developments in science and technology raise fundamental
questions about the doctrines and institutional structures of the interna-
tional legal system. The system attempts to operate according to the basic
premise, from a previous era, that the nation-state is and ought to be legally
supreme within its territorial domain - a premise increasingly obsolete, at
least at the functional level.1
I. Introduction
The accelerating pace and expanding scope of modem industrializa-
tion and technological development have created commensurately dy-
namic challenges for the international legal system. This article identifies
and analyzes one such challenge, herein referred to as the "Box H prob-
lem," that uniquely combines the three elements of irreversibility, univer-
sality, and time-lag between action and effect. This novel conjunction of
variables renders past norms obsolete, leaves traditional decision-making
processes inappropriate, and warrants new legal conclusions. The chal-
lenge obtains because such problems will first be recognized and under-
stood, if at all, only in countries with superior scientific resources. While
traditional international norms would encourage patience and multilat-
eral cooperation, historical analysis suggests that measures to achieve ac-
tion through cooperation alone will prove inherently cumbersome and
inadequate as a means of addressing Box H problems; with respect to the
three elements, delayed action is the functional equivalent of inaction and
actively cultivates crises. In the end, such a circumstance may require
unilateral action.
For a variety of reasons, multilateral international cooperation is ex-
tremely unlikely on issues of tremendous economic consequence when
the costs of disassociation are not quickly exacted. Nevertheless, impor-
t J.D., Yale Law School, 1991. The author gratefully acknowledges the invaluable com-
ments and criticism of W. Michael Reisman, Hohfeld Professor of Jurisprudence, Yale Law
School, Michael Caglioti, Christopher Coons, and Michael Eisner, all of whom were generous
with time and insight, and none of whom necessarily share the author's views.
1. Drawn from Livingston, Science Technology and International Law: Present Trends
and Future Developments, in 4 THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 68, 118 (C.
Black & R. Falk eds. 1972).
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tant global neighbors rarely approve of result-oriented coercive interven-
tion unless perceiving a consequent benefit. Unprecedented complexity
may obscure this perception and thereby discourage effective unilateral
action.
In order to explore the consequences and policy implications of this
inefficiency, Part II of this article examines the nature of a threat incor-
porating the irreversibility, universality, and time-lag characteristics. Ir-
reversibility/Reversibility refers to the practical possibility of reparation
or compensation for such behavior. Universality/Particularity refers to
whether the effects of injurious behavior are essentially global or local.
Time-Lag/No Time-Lag addresses the time between an action and its
ultimate damaging effect.2 Through a hypothetical incorporating the
three characteristics, the article goes on to examine the socio-political
problems of scientifically comprehending and effectively handling such a
threat. Though this hypothetical involves currently unresolved environ-
mental issues, it is not a case study of an existing international circum-
stance, nor is it intended to draw connections to existing events. The
emphasis throughout is on the type of potential threat, for which this
hypothetical merely serves as a vehicle of analysis.
3
Part III examines traditional responses to the hypothetical that are
likely to accompany any Box H problem. It examines both theoretical
and representative multilateral efforts within the subject of the hypotheti-
cal, and concomitant barriers to international cooperation, in order to
determine whether existing geopolitical, social, and legal structures could
permit effective response to the genre of Box H threats. Part III con-
cludes that interventionist and coercive tinilateral efforts may be both
necessary and efficacious.
Part IV discusses the possible modalities of coercion that will compose
an effective coercive strategy. Part V examines existing documentary and
precedential legal and extra-legal justifications for the most coercive uni-
lateral actions that may be necessary to address the hypothetical. These
justifications illuminate the legality of any equivalent or lesser actions
necessary to address any Box H problem. Expansions and reinterpreta-
tions of doctrine and policy necessary to allow such actions are then pro-
posed. Part VI acknowledges the probable impact of unilateral coercion
on existing international norms, while Part VII examines both the active
2. The Time-Lag element has no bearing on the time necessary to repair or compensate
damage.
3. The assumptions employed and the concomitant actions and justifications explored de-
rive from a worst-case scenario. In the same fashion as analogous hypotheticals animate much
of a country's national defense policy, this method demarcates the theoretical moraines short
of which actions are considered possible, and then evaluated for advisability.
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and appraising roles of non-governmental organizations, proposing crite-
ria to be employed in the assessment and containment of unilateral
coercion.4
Ordinarily, laws influence behavior, and behavioral norms influence
the prescriptive process. This is particularly true in the international
arena, where past behavior sometimes becomes the law.5 Consequently,
in order for a policy to begin to affect future behavior, one must ordina-
rily change both current behavior and law. To allow the effective unilat-
eral action that the hypothetical necessitates, one must change both the
behavior of the technologically relevant actor, herein the "technological
actor," and the laws either inhibiting its action, or guiding the normative
assessments of other relevant elites. Simply put, leaders of technologi-
cally advanced countries6 must, at some point, address and act upon cer-
tain types of scientific knowledge that existing international legal norms
fail to address. They must articulate national policies either accelerating
substantive changes in the expectations of international elites or laying a
foundation for potential technocratically motivated acts, even to the lim-
its of extraterritorial coercive measures. 7 True, this is radical, dangerous,
and susceptible to abuse. Yet it may be that the alternatives are worse.
4. "Coercion" is used here in its broadest sense, including all forms diplomatic, ideologi-
cal, economic, and military. It will not refer merely to the military mode, with which it is
most commonly associated.
5. See generally Reisman, International Incidents: Introduction to a New Genre in the
Study of International Law, in INTERNATIONAL INCIDENTS: THE LAW THAT COUNTS IN
WORLD POLITICS (W.M. Reisman & A. Willard eds. 1988) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL IN-
CIDENTS] as well as the essays collected therein. Professor Reisman complains that interna-
tional lawyers tend to construe the legal universe from texts, rather than actual behavior and
events. In his view, incidents both shape and reflect expectations, and are thus norm genera-
tors and norm indicators. One can learn, therefore, what is permissible by scrutinizing behav-
ior. Id at 5-7. See also Tunldn, Remarks on the Juridical Nature of Customary Norms of
International Law, 49 CALiF L. REV. 419, 426 (1961); McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, The
World Constitutive Process of Authoritative Decision [hereinafter Constitutive Process], in IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW ESSAYS: A SUPPLEMENT TO INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY
PERSPECrIvE 191, 199-200 (M. McDougal & W.M. Reisman eds. 1981); Reisman, A Theory of
Law From a Policy Perspective, in LAW AND POLICY 75 (D. Weisstub ed. 1976), wherein it is
observed that "over time, effective acts are likely to be deemed lawful." Id. at 86. For a
comprehensive overview of international law theory, including opposing views, see McDougal,
Lasswell & Reisman, Theories about International Law: Prologue to a Configurative Jurispru-
dence, 8 VA. J. INT'L LAW 189 (1968) and the wealth of historical and contemporary sources
cited therein.
6. Note that, in the current age, technology is the root of both superior access to knowl-
edge and to international economic and military strength. As these two are strongly linked,
there is little likelihood that a country with superior scientific knowledge would have no effec-
tive power. Nevertheless, this remains a distinct possibility, implicit in the analysis to follow.
7. This article does not broadly advocate the use of force. As a matter of logic, however,
force is simply the most extreme form of coercion and analyzing it may usefully illuminate the
relative appropriateness of less coercive measures. Less coercive measures are always prefera-
ble when both possible and effective.
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II. New Problems, Science, and Law: Box H - A Conjunction of
Irreversibility, Universality, and Time-Lag
Traditional national and international mechanisms operate effectively
to solve, contain, or at least intelligently address, a wide variety of
problems that are themselves composed of various combinations of dis-
tinctive elements. This essay concerns a unique combination of elements
for which the traditional mechanisms of international law, are insuffi-
cient. For purposes of illustration, imagine a permutation of the two ele-
ments: irreversibility and universality, and their opposites (see Figure 1).





Adding the third element, time-lag, yields a total of eight possible combi-
nations of the three elements (see Figure 2):
A) Reversible Particular No Time-Lag
B) Reversible Particular Time-Lag
C) Irreversible Particular No Time-Lag
D) Irreversible Particular Time-Lag
E) Reversible Universal No Time-Lag
F) Reversible Universal Time-Lag
G) Irreversible Universal No Time-Lag
H) Irreversible Universal Time-Lag
An example of A (reversible and particular with no time-lag) is a street
riot. The effects are (primarily) local, and immediately realized. Police
action, court proceedings, and efforts of insurance companies readily "re-
verse" the damage. An example of B (reversible and particular with time-
lag) on the other hand, is any action breaching a contract that will result
in further damages occurring after the time of the breach. These "conse-
quential damages" cannot ordinarily be valued until time has passed.
Box C of Figure 2 contemplates things which are irreversible andparticu-
lar with no time-lag. Pond-filling construction resulting in the extinction
of a uniquely local fish species (e.g., the snail darter) would be an exam-
ple of this class. A problem that is irreversible and particular with time-
lag, in Box D, might involve the use of a pesticide, such as DDT. Since
concentrations of the poison increase in each of the ascending trophic
levels, the extinction of a species of a uniquely local predator may result
long after the use of the poison has ceased.
Conventional world wars are examples of Box E problems (reversible
and universal with no time-lag). While the taking of life is itself irrevers-
ible, the immediate damage to economies, cities, roads, etc., is most cer-
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tainly reversible (as Japan has demonstrated). F (reversible and universal
with time-lag) can be easily illustrated by any of a number of necessarily
complex and far-reaching international economic agreements. In the
Plaza Accord of 1985, for example, the seven leading industrial nations
reached agreement to drive down the value of the dollar vis-a-vis other
currencies in order to alleviate world trade imbalances." The Accord had
immediate global effects, yet the intended effects were not expected until
later.9 Such policies have proven to be reversible. Box G, representing
problems irreversible and universal with no time-lag, can best be illus-
trated with an image of nuclear Armageddon.10
The problems mentioned thus far comprise a spectrum of complexity
and import. Nevertheless, there are national and international institu-
tions, including existing organizations, regimes and customary practices,
that serve to repair or limit the actual or threatened damage. No such
entities exist for Box H problems.
Box H problems, which are irreversible and universal with time-lags
between a damaging action and the actual resultant damage, have been
quite rare historically. There was a time, not long ago, when neither box
G nor H problems existed. Box G, in which the damage quickly follows
the action, is more easily grasped by the limited human imagination. It
is precisely because Box H problems appear less immediate, less horrify-
ing, and hence less compelling, that to our tremendous disadvantage we
are unprepared to deal with them. Since they are likely to be difficult to
address, due to the diffusion of their causes and effects beyond the famil-
iar geographic and temporal limits of more common problems, identifica-
tion, comprehension, and solution would require intensive scientific
research. An extended analysis of a single hypothetical, therefore, will
serve to address this genre of problem, and to illuminate the inadequacy
of typical international processes attempting to confront such problems.
8. Chicago Tribune, Apr. 8, 1990, at D14, col. 1.
9. This is due to what economists refer to as the "3 Curve Effect." The J Curve Effect
results when a country's currency is devalued, thus reducing the price of exports and increas-
ing the price of imports. Yet, the value of goods imported under fixed-price contracts entered
into before the devaluation is measured in the devalued currency at the post-devaluation ex-
change rate. Paradoxically, then, the trade deficit gets worse before it gets better. As time
passes, the volume of exports increases since the lower price tends to increase demand abroad.
Conversely, the volume of imports decreases. This improved balance more than compensates
for the initial effects as it moves the country toward a trade surplus. See R. DORNBUSCH & S.
FISCHER, MACROECONOmICS 763-65 (4th ed. 1987); R. GORDON, MACROECONOMICs, 612-15
(3rd ed. 1984).
10. Although it can hardly be asserted that the nuclear threat has been defused by effective
multilateralism, the perceived immediacy of potential harm inspired a collusive (and self-inter-
ested) effort by strong governments resulting in the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in
the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No.
5433, 480 U.N.T.S. 43.
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A. The Box H Problem: A Hypothetical (Extrapolated from Global
Warming and Deforestation)
The "Box H problem," as defined above, will be explored with refer-
ence to a specific "Box H hypothetical," as defined in this section. The
challenge presented by global warming and deforestation will be a useful
tool for our exploration of Box H problems. In order to provide depth
and a more realistic historical context for examination of the hypotheti-
cal, it will at times be necessary to expand the scope of the discussion to
include the "subject of the hypothetical" (in this case, international envi-
ronmental law history).
Assume, for the purposes of this study, that the connection between
global warming and deforestation actually conforms to a worst-case sce-
nario: that is, that massive deforestation is the principal cause of global
warming, and that the three Box H elements inhere.'1
Many scientists believe that unabated exacerbation of the greenhouse
effect could lead to catastrophic increases in the temperature of the
earth's atmosphere.' 2 Rapid global climate change would, at the very
least, raise sea levels, alter patterns of water availability, and affect agri-
11. Whether this is in fact a Box H problem remains to be determined, as several elements
of the global warming cycle are somewhat disputed. See infra notes 12, 13, 15 and 19-28 for
further information on the state of scientific understanding.
12. The system is sufficiently delicate that even small changes may have profound effects
over time. The problem of temperature is not like a population problem. If there is not enough
food, plague and starvation will reduce humankind to some non-zero number capable of se-
questering resources and reproducing. Temperature, on, the other hand, can directly eliminate
food resources on several trophic levels, making the question one of existence rather than
distribution. Nor is the problem of temperature like a nuclear problem. Although both have
equally devastating potential, the bombs lie dormant until used, while temperature can creep
incrementally and incessantly without relationship to our anthropocentric conceptions of
"use."' We can drive it unintentionally.
In 1983, the National Academy of Sciences estimated that a doubling of carbon dioxide
concentrations over pre-industrial levels would cause global temperatures to rise 1.5 to 4.5
degrees Celsius. Shabecoff, Haste of Global Warming Trend Opposed, N.Y. Times, Oct. 21,
1983, at Al, col. 3. The World Meteorological Organization (WMO), the United Nations
Environment Programme (UNEP), and the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU)
reaffirmed these estimates. Such a climate change, they determined, would have significant
implications for man and the environment.
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culture and global ecosystems. 13 Over time, these changes might threaten
survival itself.14
To lay the foundation for warming as the hypothetical Box H problem,
it is necessary to briefly summarize some of the scientific complexities. 15
A primary cause of this warming appears to be increasing carbon levels
in the air, since carbon dioxide (CO2) absorbs radiant heat. The so-called
"greenhouse effect" occurs when energy, in the form of sunlight, passes
through the atmosphere on the way to the earth's surface but is trapped
by CO2 and cannot, in the form of radiant heat, escape into the upper
atmospheric strata where it would be dissipated.
Increased deforestation is a major cause of CO2 level increases for sev-
eral reasons.16 First, deforestation by burning liberates significant
amounts of the estimated 2000 billion tons of carbon currently locked in
the biomass. Second and simultaneously, both burning and logging 17
13. EPA, THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE ON THE UNITED
STATES: DRAFr REPORT TO CONGRESS (EXECUTIVE SUMMARY) 1 (J. Smith & D. Tirpak
eds. Oct. 1988) [hereinafter DRAFr ExEcUTVE SUMMARY].
The rising of the sea levels is due, primarily, to the expansion of warming seawater (which
constitutes two-thirds of the planet's surface), and, eventually, to the melting of the vast polar
icecaps. Weather patterns are driven entirely by differential heating at the equator and the
poles and will change commensurately. Rainfall distribution, for example, could change dra-
matically, leaving now arable land desertous, and possibly decreasing global food production.
(Note that land fertility is largely a function of prior vegetative growth, both in terms of nutri-
ents, and vegetative soil retention. A newly hospitable regional climate may not, therefore,
find fertile soil.)
14. Although our species has evolved within extremely narrow parameters of environmen-
tal conditions, we often ignore the fact that these conditions are remarkably rare, perhaps
unique, in space. Our parochial conceptions, for example, of merely Arctic "cold" or Saharan
"hot" would be better informed by findings of astronomy: the 850 degrees Fahrenheit surface
of Venus, or the far-beyond-frozen dark sides of interstitial galactic rubble.
15. See generally S. SCHNEIDER, GLOBAL WARMING: ARE WE ENTERING THE GREEN-
HOUSE CENTURY? (1989) [hereinafter GLOBAL WARMING]; Schneider, The Greenhouse Effect:
Science and Policy, 243 SCIENCE 771 (1989); K. KONDRATYEV, CLIMATE SHOCKS: NATURAL
AND ANTHROPOGENIC 1-71 (1988); Slocum, Major Climate Changes Likely, Say Scientists, 83
J. FORESTRY 325 (1985); Woodwell, Global Deforestation: Contribution to Atmospheric Car-
bon Dioxide, 222 SCIENCE 1081 (1983); Woodwell, The Carbon Dioxide Question, 238 Sc.
AM. 34 (1978); Woodwell, Forests and Climate: Surprises in Store, 29 OCEANUS 71 (1986/87);
lecture by G. Woodwell, Yale University, (Nov. 8, 1988) (on file with author). These studies
suggest a growing consensus among climatologists that the earth is warming, with variations of
the specified consequences. The National Academy of Sciences recently stated that "[g]lobal
environmental change may well be the most pressing international issue of the next century."
N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1989, at A16, col. 1. The six warmest years in the last 130 have all been
in the 1980s. The first part of 1988 was the warmest ever on record. Global Warmth in 88 Is
Found to Set a Record, N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1989, at Al, col. 1.
16. The burning of fossil fuels also contributes 5.6 billion tons per year of carbon to the
atmosphere.
17. Although deforestation might not appear as linked to technological development as,
say, genetic engineering, much deforestation derives from problems of competing with or sus-
taining technological economies. Consider, for example, expanding international markets for
wood products driven by technology-facilitated standards of living, the desire to pave market-
servicing roads through forests, and increasingly mechanized logging techniques. Even defor-
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greatly reduce the absolute numbers of photosynthetic plants which
themselves extract carbon from the air through biotic exchange. Third,
this very warming increases the rate of decay of the biomass, which fur-
ther increases the escape of carbon from balanced vegetative cycles into
the atmosphere. Thus an increase in carbon in the atmosphere produces
warming which itself creates a surge of more carbon being released into
the atmosphere from the biotic reserves.18 This reciprocal effect is re-
ferrd to as a positive feedback cycle.19
The three important elements of a Box H problem characterize this
warming phenomenon. The first is its universality. Weather patterns ob-
serve no political boundaries. The second is time-lag. There is a signifi-
cant delay between the contribution of a certain amount of atmospheric
carbon and the directly commensurate temperature rise.20 Over the last
100'years, for example, the amount of CO2 has increased by 25-30%.21
There is general agreement that this change has already, conservatively,
committed the planet to a two to five degree Celsius average temperature
increase by early in the next century.2
2
estation for farmland or pastures can be viewed as largely a product of technology-facilitated
wealth disparities and the displacing expansion of urban areas.
18. Respiration itself is sensitive to a rise in temperature; decomposition increases dramati-
cally. If the rate of decomposition exceeds the rate of photosynthesis, plant life recedes and
perishes.
19. Another potential feedback system, which apparently would not begin until the Earth's
temperature passes a certain threshold, is the melting of the icecaps. Since the icecaps are
instrumental in reflecting light and heat away from the planet, their melting reduces their area
and hence reflective capacity, resulting in still further warming of the planet and accelerated
melting of the icecaps.
For more information on complex positive and negative feedback systems, see GLOBAL
WARMING, supra note 15, at 46-49; Stone, Feedbacks Between Dynamical Heat Huxes and
Temperature Structure in the Atmosphere, in CLIMATE PROCESSES AND CLIMATE SENS1TIV-
rry 6 (1984) [hereinafter CLIMATE PROCESSES]; Hartman, On the Role of Global-Scale Waves
in Ice-Albedo and Vegetation-Albedo Feedback, in CLIMATE PROCESSES, supra, at 18; Hensen,
Climate Sensitivity: Analysis of Feedback Mechanisms, in CLIMATE PROCESSES, supra, at 130;
Lashof, The Dynamic Greenhouse: Feedback Processes That May Influence Future Concentra-
tions of Atmospheric Trace Gases and Climatic Change, 14 CLIMATIC CHANGE 213, 238-39
(1989) (analyzing more than a dozen biological feedback processes and concluding they could,
operating together, double sensitivity of climatic system).
20. See generally Harvey & Schneider, Transient Climate Response to External Forcing on
10i10i Year Time Scales, Part l- Experiments With Globally Averaged, Coupled, Atmosphere
and Ocean Energy Balance Models, 90 J. OF GEOPHYSICAL RES. 2191-205 (1985).
Significant, with respect to time-lag, is the fact of a large ocean carbon bank. The CO2
pressure gradient between the atmosphere and the ocean seeks equilibrium (much as sealed
soda, when opened, releases very concentrated gas to equalize the local amount of that gas in
liquid and air). Because water both absorbs and releases dissolved gases more slowly than does
air, a magic method of extracting carbon from the air would have to overcome a huge reserve
of carbon that the ocean would continually rediffuse into the atmosphere as atmospheric ex-
traction reversed the pressure gradient.
21. Woodwell, Forests and Climate: Surprises in Store, supra note 15, at 72.
22. This change is enormous when viewed in the proper time and space perspective. At
the height of the ice age, when ice sheets over one kilometer thick covered all of Canada and
217
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The third and critically important element of this phenomenon is that
it may reach a point of irreversibility.23 It simply may not be the case that
the planet's temperature can always stabilize to a hospitable range.24
This may produce an open-ended warming cycle. While irreversibility of
the warming cycle is still a somewhat disputed issue, the irreversibility of
many effects of warming is far less so. A report solicited by Congress
states:
For natural ecosystems... these changes may continue for decades once
the process of change is set into motion. As a result, the landscape of
North America will change in ways that cannot be fully predicted. The
ultimate effects will last for centuries and will be irreversible. 25
The effects of such warming could be far greater than the unacquainted
might suspect. If the temperature warms, they might argue, the crop
belts will simply move northward, and Canada and the Soviet Union will
be able to grow oranges. But the web of effects and the tremendous de-
pendence of our economies on favorable environmental conditions26 de-
fies simplistic characterization. For example, while the climate for
growing a certain crop may shift hundreds of miles, the soil there will not
often replicate that needed for the crop's growth. Additionally, even if
the soil were similar for a given plant species, those not actively planted
may be incapable of migrating to other areas. In the 1800 years since the
last ice age, for example, oak trees migrated northward in the United
States as the ice sheet receded; temperatures warmed several degrees over
much of the northern United States, the temperature was only three to five degrees Celsius
colder than it is today. GLOBAL WARMING, supra note 15, at 28.
23. Peter Usher, chief climatologist of the United Nations Environment Program, stated
that although there is uncertainty as to how much of the weather patterns of recent years is
attributable to global warming, there is no doubt that an irreversible process has already be-
gun. U.N. Scientists Again Warn of Global Warming, U.P.I., June 3, 1989; Scientist Says Ef-
fects of Global Warming Could Be Irreversible, Reuters, Dec. 6, 1988.
24. See generally Hansen, Climate Response Times: Dependence on Climate Sensitivity and
Ocean Mixing, 229 SCIENCE 857 (1985); Hansen & Lebedeff, Global Trends of Measured Sur-
face Air Temperatures, 92 J. OF GEOPHYSICAL REs. 13345-372 (1987) (as updated by Global
Surface Air Temperatures Update Through 1987, 15 GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS 323-26
(1988)); CLIMATE PROCESSES, supra note 19; J. PENNER, UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY PROJECT REPORT AND SUMMARY: CLIMATE CHANGE AND ITS IN-
TERACTIONS WITH AIR CHEMISTRY: PERSPECTIVES AND RESEARCH NEEDS (1988); and ar-
ticles collected in 15 E.P.A. J. (Jan./Feb. 1989).
25. DRAFr EXECuTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 13, at 7. See also Global Warming: Mak-
ing Policy Amid Uncertainty, Boston Globe, Feb. 12, 1990, at 33 (49 Nobel laureates and 700
members of the National Academy of Sciences appealed to President Bush, stating that "[the
severity and rate of climate change.., could be substantial and irreversible on a time scale of
centuries.").
26. We depend on such conditions, for example, to provide sufficient regional drinking
water and hydroelectric power, to maintain water levels stable enough to keep major cities
above water, to prevent fertile fishing areas from moving elsewhere, and to allow food produc-
tion on several trophic levels.
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thousands of years. Various models of warming-induced changes, how-
ever, currently predict that climatic zones may shift hundreds of miles in
a single century; the rate of change is dangerous, even independent of its
magnitude. Such unprecedentedly swift disruption clearly would have
enormous ramifications not only in terms of irreversible species extinc-
tion, but also in terms, for example, of such conditions as dried and
wind-scattered topsoil and hopelessly salinated farmland submerged by
encroaching seawater. 27
Employing the background assumptions that global warming is a Box
H problem, that deforestation is its principal cause,28 and that one coun-
try is the major deforester, let us now expand and clarify our hypotheti-
cal scenario:
1) Let us imagine ourselves leaders of the world's technologically superior
country.
2) Due to remarkably sophisticated climatic models and analysis, we are
the first country in the world to become possessed of the "facts" as above-
related and convinced of their accuracy.
3) Recognizing that a threshold of irreversibility with respect to specific
environmental damage is necessarily approaching, we send our most com-
petent scientists from various disciplines to predict, within a relatively spe-
cific range, the probable date of threshold- transgression (the abstract
moment beyond which severely harmful warming is inevitable), if the cur-
rent rate of a country's deforestation continues unabated.
4) In the meantime, we conscientiously implement serious modifications in
our own domestic forest management policy, and use extensive and contin-
.uing diplomatic and ideological tools at our disposal to effect international
environmental policy change ... to no avail.
5) The scientists predict that there is a high (X%) probability of threshold
transgression within Y time.
27. The Science Advisory Board to the EPA stated that "[iln the Subcommittee's judg-
ment, there is a broad scientific consensus on the type of climate change that could occur from
alteration of the composition of the atmosphere." REvIEw OF THE REPORT TO CONGRESS:
THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE ON THE UNITED STATES, Feb. 14,
1989, at 3-4. The Board stated that the scientific community had far less confidence in the
regional impact predictions than in the predictions for aggregate global warming. Id. at 4.
The accuracy of the incredibly complex climatic models (measured, in part, by their ability to
generate retroactive predictions that conform to past and current data) is improving. See With
Cloudy Crystal Balls, Scientists Race to Assess Global Warming, N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1989, at
Cl, col. 1; GLOBAL WARMING, supra note 15, at 78-119. But see Scientists Dispute Global
Warming Theory, Boston Globe, June 7, 1989, at 20, dol. 3; Globl Warming Requires Moke
Study Before Action, Experts Say, Chicago Tribune, June 8, 1989, at 29;,Pseudo-Scientific Hot
Air: The Data on Climate are Inconclusive, N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1988, at A27, col. 1.
28. In reality, it appears that deforestation is only one cause of warming, since emissions
from the burning of fossil fuels seem to account for the majority of released carbon dioxide.
See generally The Environment Survey, a separate inclusion in THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 2, 1989,
at 13. This highlights the complexity of the "clean hands" problem as a potential barrier to a
cohtributing country's effective transboundary action.
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6) For a variety of reasons (elaborated below), no international agreement
can quickly be reached with respect to the data or the theoretical model.
7) Imagine further that the target (or "transgressive") country is easily
identifiable and controls vast and relatively unique forests. It either refuses
to alter its current deforestation policy, or is insufficiently in control of its
citizens who continue deforestation on their own.
29
Certainly, as X approaches 100% or as Y approaches zero, our resolve
to effect immediate change increases. Faced with the posited threat,
what pattern of international norms confronts us? How will these norms
affect our decisions, and what will we need to decide? In the final analy-
sis the questions flow in three tiers, and one advances from one to the
next only if an answer is negative, indicating violation of prevailing inter-
national norms:
Who Will Act:
Will effective action be multilateral?
The Nature of the Act:
If non-multilateral, will such action involve the cooperation of the
target country?
Justification, Consequence and Appraisal.
i) If an action must be non-multilateral and coercive, what
variations of modalities of action are available?
ii) If an action is non-multilateral and coercive, how can such
an act be justified?
iii) If non-multilateral and coercive, what consequences may
ensue?
iv) If non-multilateral and coercive, by what criteria may such
actions be appraised or restrained in order to prevent un-
checked oppression or expansionism?
The three elements (irreversibility, universality, and time-lag between
action and effect) of the Box H threat, and the three tiers of decisional
process it requires, reveal a significant problem: there is no demonstrated
political mechanism for dealing swiftly and effectively with such complex
situations, and no likelihood of achieving one in the near future. Ordina-
rily, until a crisis validates itself by catastrophe, the whole concern is an
abstraction. 30 The problem is that here catastrophe, because of the sub-
29. Although reference will occasionally be made to Brazil for purposes of highlighting,
for example, Third World general resistance to pressure from industrialized nations, an expli-
cation of any existing relations with Brazil would involve additional complications and is not
necessary for this inquiry. Rather, the severable issue of deforestation's posited relationship to
global warming is sufficiently close, and incorporates enough potential players, problems, and
complexities, that it will valuably serve.
30. See generally R. FALK, THIS ENDANGERED PLANET: PROSPECTS AND PROPOSALS
FOR HUMAN SURVIVAL (1971) [hereinafter THIS ENDANGERED PLANET]; O'Brien & Mar-
chand, Politics, Technology and Technology Assessment [hereinafter Politics, Technology and
Technology Assessment], in THE POLMCS OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT: INSTITUTIONS,
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stantial time-lag, occurs too late. Conceptually, an immediate cessation
of the actual activities capable of transgressing the threshold of irreversi-
bility is necessary at some moment just prior to the transgression. Since
the transgression may occur long before its actual effects are manifested,
action may need to precede consensus.
To put in proper context the inquiry into who will act, it is first neces-
sary to examine further general characteristics underlying Box H
developments.
B. The Relationship of Science and Society: Characteristics
Before we can examine the possibilities for cooperation and multilater-
alism in the international forum in the context of Box H threats, it is
necessary briefly to examine significant issues that permeate and funda-
mentally affect any analysis of the interrelation of science, technology,
and society.31 Ordinarily, scientific advancement precedes law, and this
sequence is not problematic. In an age of rapidly increasing destructive
capacity, however, law should not lag significantly behind the science
which may both enhance destructive capabilities, and suggest methods of
restraint.32 One might fruitfully observe six qualities that characterize
the relationship of science to society and pose significant problems in the
endeavor to bring science to bear upon law. All of these are readily dis-
cernable in the domestic arena, and all of them can be expected to im-
pede further effective progress in the intricate international arena.
The first characteristic is increasing complexity. Increasing sophistica-
tion of scientific inquiry leads to increasing specialization. Generalists
like Leonardo Da Vinci and Benjamin Franklin have given way to career
specialists in high temperature superconductivity or nuclear fusion. The
generalists, faced with rapidly mounting accumulated knowledge in in-,
creasing numbers of narrow subspecialties, have not the time to become
definitive authorities in several fields at once. Commensurate with this
increasing sophistication, technology has become far more hidden and
mysterious as we now observe not catapults but nuclear reactions, the
PROCESSES, AND POLICY DISPUTES 9-10 (D. O'Brien & D. Marchand eds. 1982) ("Govern-
ments typically respond to technological developments only after deleterious consequences
have proved demonstrable and/or public attention and pressure has become so focused and
intense as to force technology-policy issues on political agendas.").
31. See generally SCIENCE AND ITS PUBLIC: THE CHANGING RELATIONSHIP (G. Holton
& W. Blanpied eds. 1976); SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY: A CROSS DISCIPLINARY
PERSPECTIVE (I. Spiegal-Rosing & D. Price eds. 1977) [hereinafter SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY
AND SOCIETY].
32. See generally TECHNOLOGY AND POLITICS (M. Kraft & N. Vig eds. 1988).
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computer replacing the abacus, and medical treatments becoming in-
creasingly mechanized and chemical-intensive.
This accelerating complexity has yielded a second and distinct prob-
lem in education and conceptualization. The most recent centuries have
witnessed a somewhat artificial bifurcation and divorce of scientific in-
quiry from the humanities and political philosophy. For example,
although there is increasing and available evidence that behavior has far
more genetic components than previously thought, most academic stud-
ies of human behavior do not integrate an understanding of biology and
evolution with the analysis of politics, economics, or sociology.3 3 Though
there have been some efforts at integration, none have had significant
impact.34 The understandable result of these two developments, skepti-
cism, is a third barrier to comprehension and understanding. Since it is
difficult to filter the flood of materials from disciplines in which one has
not been trained, a certain amount of doubt fosters clarity, the reassess-
ment of explanations, and possibly an increase in accuracy. On the other
hand, continued skepticism compounded by the public's frequently indis-
criminate authority-ascribing processes35 may be dysfunctional and may
impede the effort to bring science to bear on policy and law.3 6 While
some may appropriately assert that a scientist's individual preferences
may create an inherently biased normative agenda that leads to biased
results, 37 a society's continued resistance to certain scientific conclusions
33. R. MASTERS, THE NATURE OF POLITICS xi (1989). Historically many disciplines were
embraced holistically. Plato's REPUBLIC, for example, spans mathematics, physics, chemistry,
biology, philosophy, and polities. Aristotle, too, discussed biology and physics as Well as poli-
ties and ethics.
34. See SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY, supra note 31 (discussing attempts at such
integration).
35. Commenting on this phenomenon, one scholar observed:
Unfortunately... doubt is sometimes voiced by high-ranking scientists and economists
rarely, however, among those whose work brings them closest to the evidence. But the
general public and newsmen too often fail to discriminate among scientists. On a question
of ecology, the subjective opinion of a Nobel laureate in high energy physics may com-
mand more attention and respect than the opposing judgment of a relatively unknown
ecologist. The public is then led to conclude that the scientists disagree and, therefore,
there is no basis for action. The fact that the relevant scientists may not disagree is lost
upon those who do not really understand the issues or the actors - and frequently that
includes most people.
L. CALDWELL, IN DEFENSE OF EARTH: INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF THE BIOSPHERE
228 (1972) (emphasis in original).
36. See J. WATKINS, SCIENCE AND SCEPTICISM (1984) (which attempts to fathom whether
the best corroborated theory is necessarily the best theory).
37. See Fisch, Psychology of Science, in SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY, supra note
31, at 277 (discussion of motives, attitudes, and values of scientists that affect orientation and
expectancies of research and research analysis). See also M. BLISSET, POLITICS IN SCIENCE
(1972) (arguing that scientists are essentially political in character, never neutral or disinter-
ested). But see G. GILBERT & M. MULKAY, OPENING PANDORA'S Box: A SOCIOLOGICAL
ANALYSIS OF SCIENTISTS' DISCOURSE (1984) (as a sophisticated disagreement, in part, with
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will silhouette a different normative agenda, one that leads to a biased
rejection of results.
In potentially dangerous combination with skepticism is a fourth char-
acteristic, "the irreducible frailties of the human intellect."'38 Paramount
among these are a singular limit to imagination and a certain temporal
myopia. Science, for instance, often concerns things far larger or far
smaller than we consciously confront in our daily lives. Yet some major
problems arise precisely in these realms with which we are less familiar.
The hypothetical, for example, requires us to wrestle with greater time
spans, volumes and quantities than most ever imagine.39
Think, for instance, of how difficult it would be, over breakfast's juice,
toast, and morning newspaper, to worry about a few degrees rise in tem-
perature over the next few decades, or any other Box H problem. A few
decades seems, at first, a long time. If our lifespans were merely quadru-
pled, to approximate that of numerous living species, it would certainly
have a profound effect on our life strategies. As things are, we appar-
ently expire far too quickly to care.40 Humankind evidently prefers to
believe in the myth of infinite resources and the unchanging permanence
of earth and its human exploiters. Since we do not have as vivid an un-
derstanding of long-term interests as of the immediate sensory world, our
species seems predisposed both to fail to recognize the costs of current
actions, and to spread the true costs of its current lifestyle (and generated
Box H problems) vertically, through time, to future generations.41
Blisset); Lakoff, Scientists, Technologists and Political Power, in SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND
SOCIETY, supra note 31, at 355, 373; Mulkay, Sociology of the Scientific Research Community,
in SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY, supra note 31, at 93. See S. TESH, HIDDEN ARGU-
MENTs: POLITICAL IDEOLOGY AND DISEASE PREVENTION POLICY (1988) (for a case-study
of the "inextricable interrelationship between facts and values, both in the search for the causes
of disease and in the process of developing the best preventive policy").
38. Politics, Technology, and Technology Assessment, supra note 30, at 1, 2.
39. For example, what does five billion tons of carbon look like? Humans have consist-
ently demonstrated a manifest inability to imagine zeros, both spatially and temporally. See
generally J. PAULOS, INNUMERACY: MATHEMATICAL ILLITERACY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
(1988). This can create an intellectual Doppler effect, warping our sense of time even as we are
experiencing it. This would be dramatically demonstrated if a railway track were to be con-
structed as a model of time from the origin of the earth until the present. If the distance
between each tie represents 2,000,000 years, then there are 2300 ties in the track. If the ties are
spaced at one meter apart, the second to last one was laid when manlike creatures first stood
upright upon the earth. The history of man begins only a few centimeters back from the front
end of the last tie, and modem history begins only a few millimeters back. Although the
length of the entire track is more than two kilometers, our technological society goes back only
200 microns (0.2 millimeters), just the thickness of a grain of dust upon the last tie. G. ABELL,
EXPLORATION OF THE UNIVERSE 287 (4th ed. 1982).
40. Cf. "In the long run, we're all dead." Attributed to J.M. Keynes.
41. Cf. Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM ECON. REV. 347 (1967)
(discussing inefficiency of such generational cost-spreading and discussing theoretical brokers
of future interests).
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Yet even this may be related to a fifth, more fundamental problem:
long-range planning may ordinarily be maladaptive. It is no secret, for
instance, that institutionally mandated, frequent supplantation of leaders
decreases an office holder's accountability for long-term policies, thereby
effectively foreclosing the appropriation of resources for long-range plan-
ning.42 Additionally and more ominously, it ultimately may be histori-
cally, economically, and biologically maladaptive for a society (or
country) to divert resources of time, energy, and money into long-term
planning, since resources devoted to planning are necessarily diverted
from immediately practical behavior, leaving long-term planners at a
competitive disadvantage.
While some people are overly skeptical, as mentioned earlier, others
may be insufficiently so, leading to a sixth problem: unrealistic hopeful-
ness. The semi-mystical nature of technology, perhaps coupled with a
human propensity to believe in panaceas and shortcuts to success, occa-
sionally produces an over-optimism that science and technology can in
time solve all of the community's latent ills. 43 More broadly, scholars,
politicians, and indeed most of society continue to expect that a particu-
lar problem will have a "technical" solution, one not demanding adapta-
tion or adjustment of human values. 4 Despite these expectations,
modernization has created problems that defy a simple technical solu-
tion. The Box H problem is one such problem, and it cannot be solved
by new scientific inventions.
45
Thoroughly mixing the foregoing six elements of complications and
tension within the modern relationship of science and society produces a
number of collateral effects. Recognition of the power of technology has
42. See, eg., H. WILENSKY, ORGANIZATIONAL INTELLIGENCE: KNOWLEDGE AND POL-
Icy IN GOVERNMENT AND INDusTRy 87 (1967).
43. See, eg., Weinberg, Can Technology Replace Social Engineering?, in TECHNOLOGY
AND MAN'S FuTuRE 29-39 (A. Teich ed. 1972).
44. See generally Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
Scientists themselves have cautioned against such an overconfident attitude. At the end of a
scholarly work on nuclear war, for example, two authors restated this caution, commenting
that "[lt is our considered professional judgment that this dilemma has no technical solution.
If the great powers continue to look for solutions in the area of science and technology only,
the result will be to worsen the situation." Wiesner & York, National Security and the Nu-
clear-Test Ban, 211 Sci. AM. 27, 35 (1964), cited in Hardin, supra, at 1243.
Two prominent authors have argued that the population problem, for example, is of this
class of problems without simple technical solutions. Hardin, supra, at 1246. Cf. TECHNOL-
OGY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 4 (J. Syzliowicz ed. 1981) ("[There is] no such thing as a
"Technological Fix" for social problems (e.g.... population growth) because the very act of
solving one problem inexorably and inevitably creates a range of new problems whose solu-
tions are each as difficult as the original. What remains to be understood and assessed... is
not the promise of science and technology, but rather how that promise can be implemented in
a manner that genuinely promotes human welfare.").
45. See generally TECHNOLOGY AND PoLITIcs, supra note 32.
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led, for example, to fear as well as worship. The possibility of that power
infiltrating the political process to an unacceptable extent has caused a
number of authors and politicians to warn of the darker side of technol-
ogy: nuclear evils and fundamentally horrific developments in chemical
or genetic engineering.46 This view raises the "specter of technocracy"
and claims that science and technology must be carefully contained,
since they impose their own imperatives that may displace traditional
social values.47 Sich a view would tend to exclude appropriate, as well as
inappropriate, scientific influence. Camouflaged at the other extreme are
those who appear to include science in political processes, actually only
annexing scientific authority to predetermined political goals. Industry
leaders, military leaders and politicians benefit directly when employing
technological rhetoric to capitalize on anxiety about international eco-
nomic and military supremacy, subsequently stressing the importance
and promise of bolstered research budgets.48 Such an approach has often
lead to gross misappropriation, misinterpretation, and disinformation of
events in the world of science.49
Regardless of which approach is prevalent or popularized, the fact re-
mains that it is from the political arena that scientific advancements will
be quashed or implemented and from which research funds will dictate
46. Politics, Technology, and Technology Assessment, supra note 30, at 1. See also B. FAR-
RINGTON, SCIENCE AND POLITICS IN THE ANCIENT WORLD (1966) (tracing obstacles of pub-
lic ignorance and superstition to spread of a scientific outlook from Anaximander (c. 610
B.C.E.), and highlighting that public views are often a combination of superstition and politi-
cally intended deceit).
47. See, eg., J. ELLUL, THE TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY (1967); R. LAPP, THE NEW
PRIESTHOOD: THE SCIENTIFIC ELITE AND USES OF PowER 3 (1965) ("[W]e face the real
danger of a layered society in which a scientist elite faction floats on top and dominates our
policy making. The danger is that a new priesthood of scientists may usurp the traditional
roles of democratic decisionmakig."); D. DICKSON, THE NEW POLITCs OF SCIENCE (1984);
Lakoff, supra note 37.
48. See D. DICKSON, supra note 47, at 3-4. In the United States, for example, President
Reagan's State of the Union address at the beginning of 1983 has been characterized as a
"hymn of praise to the cornucopia of technological promise," and the 1984 presidential cam-
paigns emphasized how technology policy could "reindustrialize" America. Id.
49. At times this has caused the public to be grossly misled. Id. at 261-306 (identifying
numerous incidents in which American public may have been misled by political claims to
"scientific support" for policies, procedures, goals, and expenditures, and providing insightful
discussion regarding ideological and material roles of science).
One study has concluded that the circumstance of misleading the public is particularly prev-
alent when politicians misconstrue the role of scientists they have asked for advice, often pre-
ferring to frame information provided as legitimation of their own agenda rather than
apolitical guidance. J. PRIMACK & F. VON HIPPEL, ADVICE AND DISSENT: SCIENTISTS IN
THE POLITICAL ARENA (1974). Some have suggested that there is an endemic conflict be-
tween scientists and politicians, since the latter tend to disfavor anything reducing their power
over public perceptions of policy. Masters & Kantrowitz, Scientific Adversary Procedures: The
SDI Experiments at Dartmouth, in TECHNOLOGY AND POLITICS, supra note 32, at 282.
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the existence, priorities, and direction of current developments.50 These
"institutional constraints" 51 can operate as effective barriers to the con-
vergence of knowledge and goals.
52
Additionally, modern studies of the politics of technology assessment
note with concern the "deep-rooted philosophical and normative dis-
agreements" which, they conclude, lead to "fragmented... and pluralis-
tic political institutions and processes," particularly in a democratic
polity designed to diffuse power.53 Consequently, the evaluation of tech-
nology's changing roles is disorganized, unfocused, and unalterably dis-
tracted by the ensuing political cacophony. Ironically, while many
theorists conclude that such constraints preserve a society from the per-
ceived threat of technocracy, their conclusions highlight the perhaps
greater threat that, in the context of Box H problems, understandings of
the scientific community may be isolated and not effectively implemented
by policy-makers. 54
Yet many of the characteristics and problems discussed thus far could
be addressed by aggressive national policies. The final and most impor-
tant characteristic of the relationship between science and society is the
international knowledge gap.55 One of the most imposing barriers to ad-
dressing a Box H problem is the fact that, on a larger level, the peoples of
the globe comprise one vast society, separated and factionalized by such
things as geography, culture, religion, and language. The levels of
50. See generally E. MESTHENE, TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE (1970); SCIENCE AND POLI-
TICS (V. Bogdanor ed. 1984); J. KATZ, PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS AND SCIENCE POLICY (1978);
Lakoff, supra note 37, at 356; L. COLE, POLITICS AND THE RESTRAINT OF SCIENCE (1983).
51. W. LAMBRIGHT, GOVERNING SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 85 (1976),
52. Political systems often reward and encourage short term goals and thus scientists fre-
quently cannot compete for the ears of policy makers with the more pressing concerns of the
constituency or corporate and industrial powers. See generally GOVERNING SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY IN A DEMOCRACY (M. Goggin ed. 1986) (containing essays on the fundamental
problem of autonomy and accountability in rapidly advancing technology, and proposing coor-
dination of government, university, industry, public, and scientific communities). But see Poli-
tics, Technology and Technology Assessment, supra note 30, at 3 ("Politics, like ethics, religion,
and culture, represents only another arena that gives expression to technological
imperatives.").
53. Politics, Technology, and Technology Assessment, supra note 30, at 6; CONTROVERSY:
POLITICS OF TECHNICAL DECISIONS (D. Nelkiri ed., 2d ed. 1984) (collection of case studies of
disputes between science, public, and government factions in U.S. on issues such as nuclear
waste disposal, automobile airbags, and fetal research).
54. See, eg., Lakoff, supra note 37, at 371 (palliating fear of technocracy and concluding
that "scientific or technological expertise is not likely to win for its possessors a decisive share
in political power"); D. PRICE, THE SCIENTIFIC ESTATE (1965) (specter of technocracy un-
likely given checks and balances in governmental systems; concluding that, due to technical
complexities, governments need increasingly to integrate technical capacity into political pro-
cess, with results, on balance, beneficial).
55. See Szyliowicz, Technology, The Nation State: An Overview, in TECHNOLOGY AND
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, supra note 44, at 1-39.
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achievement in science, and indeed the focus of scientific endeavors, are
radically different among nations.56 Some have suggested that the par-
ticular form of scientific argumentation and demonstration that Western
scientists have developed is rooted in a highly particularistic Western
society to such an extent that it creates a threshold of general accultura-
tion that non-Westerners must cross before they can understand, repli-
cate, and extend similar scientific theories and experimentations. 5 7 These
differences in science are paramount to differences in language; lack of a
common basis and focus obviate true communication of scientific
research, methods, analysis, or conclusions. Thus the technological actor
will encounter grave difficulty trying to transmit its information and con-
vince the target country of the dire consequences attending its uninter-
rupted behavior. These differences in scientific development pose a
major obstacle to overcoming problems incorporating time-lag
phenomena.
These cultural, conceptual, and structural obstacles act as indepen-
dently operating defense systems, inextricably linked in the protection of
divergent and perhaps antiquated world views. Yet because. of the ap-
proach of unprecedented potential juxtapositions of irreversibility,
universality, and time-lag, we either need to transcend each of these lim-
itations as a cooperative community, or to develop in a timely fashion a
legal theory not prohibitive of properly motivated and effective unilateral
acts.
III. Cooperation: An Unrealistic and Unrealizable Hope
This section analyzes the relative potentials for multilateralism, pluri-
lateralism, and unilateralism in the context of Box H threats.
56. Ninety percent of all current research is still conducted in only a few rich countries.
Id at 4. See also SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND GLOBAL PROBLEMS: VIEWS FROM THE DE-
VELOPING WORLD 53-60 (S. Radhakrishna ed. 1979) (survey of data regarding scientific insti-
tutions and publications in developing countries); SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND ECONOMIC
GROWTH IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (G. Skorov ed., J. Warren trans. 1978) (essays examin-
ing science expenditures in developing countries, and barriers to scientific and technological
progress consequent to inequities of distribution); R. CLARKE, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN
WORLD DEVELOPMENT (1985); SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND DEVELOPMENT: THE POLT-
ICAL ECONOMY OF TECHNICAL ADVANCE IN UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES (C. Cooper ed.
1978).
57. See, e.g., F. NORTHROP, THE MEETING OF EAST AND WEST: AN INQUIRY CON-
CERNING WORLD UNDERSTANDING (1946); Northrop, The Complementary Emphases of
Eastern Intuitive and Western Scientific Philosophy, in PHILOSOPHY: EAST AND WEST 168 (C.
Moore ed. 1944).
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A. Multilateralism: The Impossible
Minimally effective multilateralism can and has been achieved as the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATI), 58 the Universal Copy-
right Convention,59 the 1980 United Nations Convention on Contracts
for the International Sale of Goods,6" the New York Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 61 and a host
of other multilateral agreements all indicate. Yet, assuming that the
technological actor is convinced of a causal relationship between the
transgressive country62 and the approaching crisis, is cooperative action
of many international players feasible for Box H problems?
In continuing our inquiry, we can usefully examine historical multilat-
eral theory and actual practice in those areas of international relations
that serve as background for our extended hypothetical. More specifi-
cally, we can evaluate the nature and probable success of multilateralism
in general by examining actual and related representative multilateral
events and efforts, and extrapolating these to likely Box H international
responses.
1. Theory of Multilateralism, as Applied to the Subject of the
Hypothetical
Writers on global, ecology, as recently as the 1970s, exhibited a firm
belief in the efficacy of international efforts. Their writings focused pri-
marily on "buying time" until intergovernmental regimes could achieve a
world order system. All that needed to be done, they argued, was to
rearrange international economic structures and achieve identity of inter-
ests among nations by equalizing both access to knowledge and living
standards. In 1975, Professor Falk stated: "In the immediate period
ahead one will probably have to concentrate on plugging holes in the
ecological dike and hope that a movement for more ambitious varieties of
global reform takes hold of the political imagination throughout the
world. ' 63 This position can be characterized as "wait and hope." While
the subsequent 15 years failed to achieve this ambitious reform, the rhet-
58. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. pts. 5-6, T.I.A.S. No.
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.
59. Universal Copyright Convention, July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, T.I.A.S. No. 7868,
943 U.N.T.S. 178.
60. 1980 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 97/18, Annex I (1980), reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 671 (1980).
61. New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 31.
62. As stated earlier, the analysis assumes that the transgressive country is a readily identi-
fiable primary contributor to the problem.
63. Falk, The Global Environment and International Law: Challenge and Response, 23 U.
KAN. L. REv. 385, 420 (1975) [hereinafter Falk, Global Environment].
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oric espousing the possibilities of effective and timely cooperation has
proliferated. Some believe that although the concept of state sovereignty
is pernicious in this context, when nations see their "interests and welfare
protected by international action to an extent unattainable by their own
[governments]," they will abandon "exaggerated interpretations of
sovereignty." 64
Some of these same writers conclude that there is. simply no practical
alternative to multilateralism, and that peaceful coexistence requires it.
"In a world of nations, measures for the salvation of the world can be
taken only by cooperative international action."' 65 Such authors reason
that since there is no possible agreement upon a single standard of equity
with respect to the use of resources, compromise is necessary. They ar-
gue that we must "work as best we can within the existing system and
with the various tools at hand." 66 '
Given the unfortunate sterility of innumerable multilateral proposals
in the field of the environment, though, it is curious that many, even
those who believe in the unprecedented urgency of certain international
environmental problems, argue only for cooperative, or institutional,
models.67 Yet have there been institutions sufficiently successful to sug-
gest that such would exist to confront the unprecedented combination of
the three elements of any Box H problem? Alternatively, are there any
models, sufficiently successful within their intended purposes, to suggest
that a new, and equally successful multilateral, institutional mode can be
appropriately designed? Section 2 explores these questions, again by fo-
cusing on efforts concerning environmental threats, efforts which may be
representative of successes or failures likely to accompany Box H
problems.
64. L. CALDWELL, supra note 35, at 145.
65. Id. at 238.
66. Bilder, International Law and Natural Resources Policies, 20 NAT. RESOURCES J. 451,
485-87 (1980) [hereinafter Law and Policies]. Professor Falk, for example, elaborates an exten-
sive cooperative system as the essence of his detailed proposals. R. FALK, THIS ENDANGERED
PLANET, supra note 30. He has designed many innovative and sensible global organizations.
He has even examined and accounted for many contingencies (except running out of time).
Nevertheless, subsequent commentators must still conclude that "[n]o single body of doctrine
yet has emerged which appropriately can be described as an 'international law of natural re-
sources,' and it still is uncertain whether the many different types of natural resources and the
diverse problems they encompass can be handled within a single framework of rules." Law and
Policies, supra, at 452.
67. See, eg., TIME, Jan. 2, 1989 (issue, entitled "Planet of the Year," includes dozens of
such suggestions); L. CALDWELL, supra note 35, at 146 ("Assuming that the present ecologi-
cal circumstances of humanity are unprecedented, it follows that unprecedented institutional
innovations may be required to deal with them.") (emphasis added). The author admits, how-
ever, that "this line of reasoning is not as yet conceded by most people or their political lead-
ers." 11
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2. Practice
What follows examines efforts to achieve multilateral cooperation and
various barriers to such efforts that bear upon the posited hypothetical.
From these we can infer that similar obstacles would confront any Box H
problem. Obstacles to multilateralism explored below include: i) the ne-
cessity of agreement on problem and cause; ii) cultural and motive dis-
parities; iii) no centralization of authority and power; iv) state
sovereignty; v) domestic impotence; vi) the tragedy of the commons; and
vii) time.
a. Representative Multilateral Efforts
Concern for ecological problems surged and peaked rapidly in 1970-
7268 and then subsided, as the international community addressed
shorter-term problems. On May 11, 1971, the U.N. Secretary General
was presented with an appeal of 2200 scientists representing 23 countries
warning of unprecedented environmental threats to mankind. 69 In 1972,
the United Nations held the famous Stockholm Conference on the
Human Environment.70 The Conference participants devised an "Action
Plan," which the General Assembly codified in December of 1972.71 In-
cluded in the elaborate structure were details for coordination of boards,
their composition and member terms, assignments, funds, etc., as Well as
recommendations to create INFOTERRA (an international environmen-
tal information system) and GEMS (a global environmental monitoring
system). 7
2
Commentators conclude that the Conference was either a great success
for clarifying international policy, or a dismal failure because it demon-
strated the extent to which governments will talk big and do nothing.73
The latter view prevails. Ten years after the Stockholm Conference, in
68. For a partial yet extensive list of numerous multilateral conventions through the 60s
and early 70s, see Livingston, supra note 1, at 96-102. See also E. HAAS, M. WILLIAMS & D.
BABAI, SCIENTISTS AND WORLD ORDER: THE USES OF TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE IN INTER-
NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 178-232 (1977) (studying what scientists involved in international
organizations, believe about relationship between specialized knowledge and collective action
for achievement of economic, social, and political goals).
69. See Krotov, Scientific and Technical Progress: The Environment and Man, in SCI-
ENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND THE FUTURE 423 (E. Velikhov, J. Gvishiani & S. Mikalinsky eds.
1980).
70. Report ofthe U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, June 16, 1972, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf. 48/14 (1972), reprinted in I1 .L.M. 1416 (1972).
71. The 1,200 delegates from 100 countries submitted over 100 specific recommendations.
Smith, The United Nations and The Environment: Sometimes a Great Notion? 19 TEx. INT'L
L.J. 335, 338 (1984).
72. Id. at 348-49. The boards eventually became the United Nations Environmental Pro-
gramme (U.N.E.P.) with a staff of approximately 150 and a budget of $30 million.
73. Falk, Global Environment, supra note 63, at 385.
230
Vol. 15:207, 1990
The Box H Problem
1982, the Nairobi Declaration 74 (under the auspices of U.N.E.P.) can-
didly recognized that the Stockholm Action Plan failed due to the lack of
foresight regarding the long-term necessity of environmental manage-
ment, lack of coordinated and sustained effort, and continued inequitable
distribution of resources. 75 Indeed, U.N.E.P.'s efforts have not achieved
global currency. Consequently, many believe that the very heart of the
U.N.E.P. Action Plan is so defective that the value of all other actions
undertaken under its aegis are accordingly weakened and devalued. 76
Any study of the subsequent history of multilateral endeavors reveals
dozens of declarations and a morass of wistful rhetoric that suggests
"strengthening" policies, advocates "broadening" programs and insists
upon the "discovery" of cheaper and better solutions. One effort of the
International Bar Association's Environmental Law Committee even en-
couraged participaits to submit detailed responses on a hypothetical re-
garding environmental pollution. 77 In spite of this continued effort to
promote multilateralism, with admittedly some success in raising con-
sciousness, the environment continues to deteriorate at an accelerating
rate.7
8
Five other representative cooperative efforts similarly demonstrate the
failure of multilateral approaches. In 1979, 31 of the 34 members of the
Economic Commission for Europe concluded the first multilateral agree-
ment specifically addressing the problems of transboundary air pollu-
tion.79"The agreement established no enforcement provisions.80 In 1982
the United Nations produced the World Charter for Nature.81 Provisions
therein specified prohibitions against disrupting nature or the integrity of
the ecosystem. It purported to impose international environmental im-
pact statements82 and concluded by stating that, "where potential ad-
74. U.N.E.P., Report of the Governing Council, 37 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 25) at 49
(Nairobi Declaration), U.N. Doc. A/37/25 (1982).
75. Id. at para. 2. Predictably, some of the major international contributors to the acid
rain problem, which was to be addressed, chose not to attend the conference in Nairobi.
76. See, ag., Smith, supra note 71, at 349.
77. ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS: AN INTERNATIONAL
SYMPOSIUM (S. McCaffrey & R. Lutz eds. 1978).
78. See, U.N.E.P., The State of the World Environment 1972-1982, at 66, U.N. Doc.
UNEP/GC(SSC)/INF.2, UNEP/GC.10/3 (1982).
79. An earlier effort had nestled a broad transboundary harm prohibition within a treaty
on economic rights and duties. That provision ended.with the hopelessly unhelpful statement
that "all States should cooperate in evolving international norms and regulations in the field of
the environment." U.N. Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, art. 30, G.A. Res.
3281 (XXIX), 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31), 50 U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975).
80. See Smith, supra note 71, at 355-56. The agreement also provided no numerical goals
for pollution reduction or timetables for clean-up action.
81. G.A. Res. 7, 37 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 17, U.N. Doc. A/37/51 (1982). See
generally Wood, The United Nations World Charter for Nature: The Developing Nations' Initi-
ative to Establish Protections for the Environment, 12 ECOLOGY L.Q. 977 (1985).
82. G.A. Res. 7, supra note 81, at art. 11(c).
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verse effects are not fully understood, the activities should not proceed,"
and that "[n]atural resources shall not be wasted ... -"83 Given the pro-
tean character of the terms employed, it is not surprising that there were
no penalty provisions. Several years later, in 1984, Sweden attempted to
strengthen the Environmental Modification Convention to no avail. 84
In 1986 the Consolidated Report of the Experts Group on Environ-
mental Law to the World Commission on Environment and Develop-
ment submitted a twenty-two article proposal for "legal principles... to
support environmental protection and sustainable development."8 5 It en-
couraged information exchange and recommended, in article 1, that "all
human beings have the fundamental right to an environment adequate
for their health and well-being," and in article 2, that "states shall con-
serve and use the environment and natural resources for the benefit of
present and future generations. ' 86 Nice. But no enforcement provisions
were included.
Most recently, the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the
Ozone Layer8 7 has illustrated the pattern of failedi multilateralism in the
subject of our hypothetical. In order to reach consensus among a myriad
of drafters, concessions had to be made that render the document of little
more than symbolic value. For example, developing countries are al-
lowed to delay compliance for 10 years in order to meet "basic domestic
needs."' 8 This term is conspicuously undefined, allowing essentially un-
reviewable discretion to the country claiming exception and delay. In
addition, the Protocol contains no effective enforcement provisions.8 9
Moreover, if we look briefly at the archetypal multilateral adjudicative
process, the International Court of Justice, we receive no assurance that
that body is capable of adequately addressing the concerns of the hypo-
thetical. The "resolution" of two disputes by the Court that relate to
environmental issues, the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case9o and the Nuclear
83. Id. at arts. 1 l(b) and 10.
84. See Westing, Environmental Warfare, 15 ENVT'L. L.'645, 658 (1985). Convention on
the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Tech-
niques, May 18, 1977, 31 U.N. GAOR Res. Supp. (No. 27), U.N. Doc. a/31/27 [hereinafter
EnMod Treaty].
85. Environmental Protection and Sustainable Development: Legal Principles and Rec-
ommendations, adopted by the Experts Group on Environmental Law of the World Commis-
sion on Environment and Development 7 (1986).
86. Id., at 9.
87. U.N.E.P., Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16,
1987, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1541 (1987).
88. Id at arts. I and 5.
89. The express language of article 8, however, contemplates some miraculous future con-
sensus on appropriate rules and tools of effective enforcement.
90. Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), 1972 I.C.J. 12 (Interim Protection Order of Aug.
17); 1973 I.C.J. 3 (Jurisdiction of the Court of Feb. 2); 1974 I.C.J. 3 (Judgment of July 25).
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Test Cases,91 were complicated in various phases by well-known and de-
monstrable failures of this multilateral adjudicative process, deriving
from a lack of effective enforcement power.92
In light of the foregoing, it is a commonly held and accurate view that
the international law of resources and pollution is yet in the "embryonic
stage of development"; that is, "legal development in this area has not
yet been evidenced by any growing acceptance of general principles of
state responsibility for environmental injury beyond territorial limits. '93
The absence of international currency for such principles has signifi-
cantly inhibited the growth of an institution capable of dealing with the
challenges of the hypothetical in particular, and, by extension, Box H
problems generally. More particularly, this brief look at unsuccessful at-
tempts to achieve multilateralism in the broad subject of the hypotheti-
cal, when joined with the threat of our specifically posited hypothetical,
suggests a number of deducible obstacles that may pervade attempts to
combat any true Box H problem.
b. Barriers to International Multilateralism
A number of problems are endemic to the effort to achieve effective
international cooperation. The problems are exacerbated by, and should
be examined in light of, the three Box H elements. For example, irre-
versibility suggests urgency and should encourage cooperation. Yet the
knowledge gap leaves this effectively hidden. Universality should actu-
ally encourage cooperation. Yet, since there will be no initial agreement
on the problem and cause of the scientifically identified threat, the fact
that the problem will have universal consequences is hidden. Time-lag,
the largest barrier, does not suggest urgency and does not compel cooper-
ation since no one wants to sacrifice now for the sole benefit of someone
else at some time in the future. Effective cooperation encounters obsta-
cles not only in convincing elites of a real threat, but also in additional
problems which would arise even were this formidable obstacle
overcome.
91. Nuclear Tests (Aus. v. Fr.), 1973 I.C.J. 99 (Interim Measures of June 22); 1974 I.C.J.
253 (Judgment of Dec. 20).
92. For criticism of the multilateral adjudicative process, see T. FRANCK, JUDGING THE
WORLD COURT (1986). But see Falk, Book Review, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1376 (1988) ("TIThis
Review concludes that Franck's approach fails to recognize the necessity of international law
of encouraging third party assessments of armed political conflicts and inhibiting illegal uses of
force.").
93. J. BARROS & D. JOHNSTON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF POLLUTION 74 (1974).
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i. Necessity of Agreement on Problem and Cause
Unless relevant actors are convinced of the exact nature of the threat,
cooperation is hopeless. Without the significant players at least recogniz-
ing where their best interests lie, symbiotic action in the areas of interest
overlap is impossible.94 It would be easy to achieve cooperation if there
were recognition of a common enemy or threat. 95 Yet problems reside in
disparities in ability to recognize threats, and the consequent lack of
common recognizance and cooperation. The problems are compounded
by the necessity of proving not only the existence of the threat, but its
cause as well. This may not be easily conceded by relevant actors.
Efforts to convince, in any situation comparable to the hypothetical,
necessitate scientific analysis. As discussed, the problem of bringing sci-
ence to bear on the issues is enormously difficult in the domestic context,
and nearly insurmountable in the international context. Significant tech-
nological knowledge disparities between nations, 96 and the lack of a col-
lective experience, indicates that there will be no collective agreement
regarding scientific data; few countries have the interest or means to ver-
ify independently, and even fewer countries would be willing to take on
faith scientific conclusions offered by characteristically self-serving elite
nations. Thus common interest, which is the precondition of coopera-
tion, is masked. Moreover, even if, in the best of all possible worlds, the
leaders of transgressive countries are convinced of the causal relationship
between their actions and environmental damage, the subsequent attempt
to agree upon the best method of combatting the cause is nevertheless rife
with opportunities for conflict. Briefly consider the following.
i. Cultural and Motive Disparities
The prevalence of cultural and motive disparities between and within
nations increases intellectual and international viscosity. Since nations
observe international legal norms only when the advantages of doing so
outweigh the disadvantages, and since nations engage with each other in
94. This is the crippling fact that makes game theory models inapplicable.
95. This is known as the amity-enmity complex. See R. ARDREY, THE TERRITORIAL IM-
PERATIVE: A PERSONAL INQUIRY INTO THE ANIMAL ORIGINS OF PROPERTY AND NATIONS
269-319 (1966).
96. There is no doubt that relatively disenfranchised countries are increasing their access
to scientifically trained personnel. Nevertheless, the available resources they can devote to
research and training tend to be fairly limited. McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, The Intelli-
gence Function and World Public Order, 46 TEMP. L.Q. 365, 411 (1973) ("Large sections of
the world must still be characterized as an enlightenment wilderness."). See also R. CLARKE,
supra note 56, at 187 ("In the developing countries less than one person in 100,000 is a scien-
tist.... [I]n most developing countries, what passes for a scientific community is still pitiful -
a small group of dedicated and talented people constantly battling for financial support, with-
out formal organizations, with scant access to the outside world of science, and often without
even the medfis to travel to important international conferences.").
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the prescriptive process along the ultimate vector of competing forces
and interests, "they are obviously drawn together in association by com-
mon fears, values and interests," and "parted by suspicion, nationalism,
acquisitiveness, fear, pride, aggression, and ignorance of each other's
motives."
97
Given the current international configuration of power concentrations,
should the technological actor and transgressive country be industrial
and Third World respectively, instead of vice versa, major issues of mo-
tive and fairness will ensue for any Box H problem. 98 In the subject of
our hypothetical (the environment), the following statement by the Sri
Lankan Ambassador to the United Nations is representative of the Third
World perspective when faced with criticism from foreign sovereigns
about its internal resource management.
[Tihe governments of developing countries, their economies, and planners
must not and will not allow themselves to be distracted from the impera-
tives of economic development and growth by the illusory dream of an at-
mosphere free from smoke or a landscape innocent of chimney stacks. We
must not... allow our concern for the environment to develop into hyste-
ria. We must see the problem in its proper perspective: physical, social,
cultural, economic, political and aesthetic.99
Having watched the major industrial powers devastate their own envi-
rons, developing countries are justifiably resistent to the idea that they
must 'now preserve, at the cost of their own development, that which
others have destroyed. 1°° This logic, although rational and justifiable,
bodes poorly for cooperation in response to any Box H problem.
iii: No Centralization of Authority and Power,
The cultural, motive, and knowledge disparities between nations result
i reciprocal distrust, and a consequent balkanization of authority. 101 Be-
cause of the diversity of the international community, the lack of central-
97. Smith, supra note 71, at 358.
98. See generally R. CLARKE, supra note 56; SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND GLOBAL
PROBLEMS, supra note 56.
99. Arvar, Thomas, Boksenbaum, & Soule, The Pollution of Asia, 13 ENV'T 10 (1971)
(quoting Ambassador H.S. Amerasinghe).
100. As an example of this industrial/developing conflict, Brazil's foreign minister, Abreu
Sodre, stated, "We cannot make the Amazon into some kind' of national park for mankind.
We must give highest priority to our own development." L.A. Times, Dec. 10, 1989, at M3,
col. 4., "Brazilian officials have also argued that the industrialized nations have no right to
criticize Brazil because they have destroyed so much of their own environment and are respon-
sible for most of the world's pollution." N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1989, at A9, col. 1.
101. The problem of authority extends to all the attempts to constitute a truly representa-
tive prescriptive body. The problem derives from these facts: 1) whichever players decide
upon the process of selection of experts or representatives will, themselvesi be largely outcome-
determinative; 2) because of this expectation, there still will not be universal perception of the
group's aulthority once empaneled; and 3) the enormous ramifications of the panel's delibera-
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ized authority results in a lack of cooperatively centralized power in the
context of Box H threats.
In the subject of our hypothetical, for example, as long ago as 1970, U
Thant, then U.N. Secretary General, stated: "If effective measures are to
be taken in time, we need something new - and we need it speedily - a
global authority with the support and agreement of governments .... -)12
Yet too many organizations and feeble attempts at multilateralism al-
ready clutter the international community. There are 5200 nongovern-
mental organizations (NGOs) registered with the Environment Liaison
Office, a coordinating body conceived by NGOs at the Stockholm Con-
ference of 1972 and designed to ensure liaison between the NGOs and
the U.N.E.P.10 3 There simply is no shortage of proposals, too numerous
to string cite, all detailed yet dormant. 104 All contemplate multilateral
support. None have grasped the minds of elites who could effect such
proposals; thus, none are effectively significant. Many represent grandi-
ose efforts that only establish future reviews of the situation and suggest
upscaled efforts to encourage countries to try harder. 105 In addition, trea-
ties that do or might exist are largely unenforceable; signatories to con-
ventions are rarely in a position to enforce internal changes in another
country. 10 6 Nor is the United Nations itself competent, as it lacks legisla-
tive power and its declarations are not binding.10 7 The efficacy of law,
tions make members of the panel the likely object of powerful and potentially corrupting
interests.
102. U Thant, The Human Environment and World Order, address of May 14, 1970, re-
printed in 7 U.N. MONTHLY CHRON. 69 (June 1970).
103. U.N.E.P., Introductory Report of the Executive Director, Addendum, Relationships
with Non-Governmental Organizations, at 1-8, para. 32, U.N. Doc. UNEP/GC.10/2Add.4
(1982).
104. An example of a considered and detailed, yet operatively ineffectual proposal is that
offered by Caldwell in IN DEFENSE OF EARTH, supra note 35. This was written in 1972, at
which time the author himself states that many of the proposals upon which he elaborates have
been "under consideration" for a decade or more.
105. See generally J. BnARos & D. JoHNsToN, supra note 93.
106. Nor is it uncommon for countries to violate or "bend" treaties at will. See Koh,
Nowak, Rees & Sofaer, The Treaty Power, 43 U. MIAMI L. REv. 101 (1988) (Professor Koh
describes United States treaty history, and notes that United States is fleeing multilateral coop-
eration and international organizations, as evidenced by a) its modified acceptance of compul-
sory jurisdiction of International Court of Justice and b) its "reinterpretation" of the ABM
Treaty to accomodate simultaneous development and testing of Strategic Defense Initiative).
Any treaty to be enforced among a subgroup of signatories is susceptible to the same problem
of enforcement. CALDWELL, supra note 35, at 110.
107. It has persuasive value, perhaps, but it is easily and legally disregarded. Its impotence
is preordained: its constituent members are more committed to the promotion of each country
than to the defense of all. Even (or perhaps especially) the Security Council, whose article 39
power is to make decisions concerning, or itself employing, appropriate uses of force, is com-
pletely handcuffed given the perennial opposition of certain constituent countries. Doran,
Can Nato Defend the Environment?, 2 ENVT'L AFF. 667 (1973) reaches a similar conclusion
about NATO, largely because of its unanimity principle and the action-inhibiting ideological
differences among members.
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and cooperation, is limited since the entire international configuration
lacks effective central authority and includes states of vastly discrepant
power.108 This, too, bodes poorly for international cooperation in re-
sponse to any Box H problem.
iv. State Sovereignty
The problem of state sovereignty is correlated to the lack of centralized
authority and power. It represents an additional hurdle to cooperative
efforts. Once again, taking as our example the existing history of the
subject of our hypothetical, we observe that "the principle of national
sovereignty over resources generally has been held to mean that the na-
tion having such sovereignty can deny all other nations access to or use
of such resources. . . . A nation which needs another's resources can
secure them only by convincing the second nation to supply them." 109
Sovereignty over natural resources is a concept defined by its proponents
as an "inalienable right of each state to the full exercise of authority over
its natural wealth and the correlative right to dispose of its resources
fully and freely." 110 Such internationally anachronistic111 concepts virtu-
ally ensure the ephemeral nature of cooperative commitments that might
otherwise be likely to be effective in confronting Box H problems.
v. Domestic Impotence: The Problem of Vox Populi
Any firm commitment emerging in the domestic arena to deal with
Box H problems, such as the critical global environmental concerns of
the hypothetical, is likely to be short-lived. As noted by Professor Har-
old D. Lasswell, who wrote widely on the behavior of political leaders,
national leaders are "entrapped" by the expectations of their followers. 12
Thus, should sufficiently farsighted leaders be convinced of the present
and future efficacy of cooperative prophylactic measures to combat Box
H, they are virtually helpless to give continuing effect to any counsel of
reasonableness that involves a drastic change in international, and hence
economic, relations.1 13 Unfortunately, people's awareness of what is ac-
108. See Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. Rlv. 1620
(1984) [hereinafter Schachter, Armed Force].
109. Law and Policies, supra note 66, at 454-55.
110. See generally 0. SCHACHTER, SHARING THE WORLD'S RESOURCES (1977) [hereinaf-
ter SCHACHTER, RESOURCES]. According to the N.Y. Times, Brazilian officials have made it
clear that "Brazil would not permit its sovereignty to be threatened by a foreign role in pro-
tecting the Amazon." Brazilians Tell of the Forest and the Fears, N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1989, at
A9, col. 1.
111. For an illustration, see the conclusion of Livingston, supra note 1, at 118.
112. See generally Lasswell, The Social and Political Framework of War and Peace, in 5
BRAIN FUNCTION: AGGRESSION AND DEFENSE 317 (1967).
113. Id.
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tually in their self-interest frequently accrues diachronically and too
slowly to be even minimally responsive to rapidly approaching threats.
114
vi. The Tragedy of The Commons
As noted earlier, human groups are, perhaps to their own demise, inca-
pable of adequately incorporating into their decisions and actions con-
ceptions of distant people, countries, and future events when a threat
appears neither massive nor immediate. International cooperation of the
nature necessary to preserve something approximating climatic homeo-
stasis, for example, is best modeled by what has been referred to as the
"Tragedy of the Commons." 115 This applies to areas to which everyone
has access but to which no one can lay exclusive claim (such as the
"air"). A cooperative strategy optimizes outcome, but competition fre-
quently obviates cooperation and results in over-exploitative strategies
that operate inexorably to reduce aggregate benefits. Very simply, an
actor who receives 100% of the benefits of her act, but pays only a frac-
tion of the costs by bearing a tiny piece of the total damage of the act,
will continue such action indefinitely.' 16 This is true even if that action is
to the extreme and future detriment of all. Analysis of where the damage
is borne contemplates both a spreading of costs between existing coun-
tries (the horizontal dimension) and a transgenerational spreading (the
vertical dimension). The model is directly applicable to the hypothetical,
for example, since the target country receives all the short-term benefit of
deforestation while it bears only its fractional part of the earth's warm-
ing, and only that which accrues within the lifetimes of its actors. This
again is a circumstance likely to arise in any Box H problem.
vii. Time
Finally, and perhaps most likely totally to eclipse international efforts
to combat Box H, is the exponential increase, over that of domestic con-
flicts, in the time necessary to overcome all of the obstacles to interna-
tional incorporation of scientific knowledge and multilateral initiatives.
Efforts to achieve effective multilateral arrangements always demand lab-
yrinthine, long, and difficult negotiations, that often continue for years
and are filled with potential snags and pitfalls.
The barriers confronting international cooperative endeavors, as illus-
trated and exemplified by scrutiny of such endeavors in the particular
114. Note, for example, how many years (and lives) expired before developed nations be-
gan to commit significant attention and resotirces to combatting AIDS, and how many people
remain apathetic to possibilities of contracting it.
115. Hardin, supra note 44.
116. Assuming, of course, that the perceived total value of the benefit is greater than that
fraction of the costs.
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subject of our hypothetical, demonstrate what we might well consider the
impossibility of achieving in sufficient time a consensus on methods to
address Box H problems.
B. Plurilateralism: The Implausible But Preferable
While consensus at a large group level is elusive, plurilateralism (coor-
dinated efforts of a small number of governments) holds at least limited
promise for Box H problems. The technological player need not, and
economic and political costs suggest it should not, leap from the futility
of large-scale cooperative efforts to aggressive unilateral ones. Neverthe-
less, when an alteration in a transgressing sovereign's internal policies or
actions is desired, a small group of even significant countries is at a
greater disadvantage to effect such a change than would be a large group.
Furthermore, as one moves across the spectrum from supermajority to a
mere plurality, one emerges from the grey zone of legality into the poten-
tial illegality of determined efforts to influence, which are by nature coer-
cive, and, which will be more critically recognized as such. It is
important to note, however, that plurilateralism emphatically is not a
midpoint on a spectrum of "acceptability" or perceived legality, with
multilateralism at one end and unilateralism at the other. Plurilateral
coercion is almost identical to unilateral coercion in that both are gener-
ally viewed as illegal.
Yet acting plurilaterally still preserves somewhat greater stability in
the international arena than does unilateral action.1 17 It still retains the
distinct advantage of safety in numbers, appearing through some illusory
analogy to democracy to be more justifiable to third parties. It sends less
waves through the precedent-loving and over-bureaucratic governmental
masses. For this reason, plurilateralism, if achievable, could arguably be
more effective than unilateralism;118 moral suasion will appear greater,
117. In a balkanized and competitive world, the balance of power tends to be delicate, and
significant pressure by all parties exists to maintain maximum constancy in the rules of the
game. The less powerful nations struggle to preserve maximum independence. The several
most powerful nations vie for positions of influence. Saving face is important to all. Thus a
somewhat unquantifiable backlash of unilateral coercive action insults the independence of the
target and sets in motion forces to strip the other superpowers of face. In a world dominated
by image, this alone may be sufficient incitement for levels of reprisal unacceptable to the
would-be acting country. (Further checks on mere expansionism are discussed below.) By
significantly raising the political and economic costs of coercion, this complex and interactive
process may approach equilibrium with the cost of a Box H problem set in irreversible motion
multiplied by the percentage of certainty, at least for the short run.
118. Minimum plurilateralism would be most effective if one, two, or several lead nations
could achieve agreement on the potential onslaught of a Box H catastrophe. Such alignment is
not completely inconceivable since the balance of military power has historically closely paral-
leled parity in scientific achievement. Ideally, close, regular, and personal communication be-
tween the science advisors of technologically elite countries, whether by teleconference,
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and greater coercive power can be brought to bear through either diplo-
matic, economic, or military instruments. Thus, for example, it would
always be a wise and practical idea for the technological actor to solicit
agreement and aid from other significant countries. The countries of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), or
even the smaller European Economic Community (EEC), for example,
could be an extremely powerful force if united.
Yet while plurilateralism is desirable, efforts to achieve it must still
confront all the barriers to international cooperation outlined above.
Thus it is still an open question to what extent plurilateralism could be
achievable quickly, and whether it would be sufficiently responsive and
successful in confronting the three elements of the genre of problem for
which the posited hypothetical, involving global warming and deforesta-
tion, is an example.
C. Unilateralism: The Imperative?
Multilateral endeavors, if attainable, unquestionably are preferable to
unilateral acts, in the abstract.1 19 But analysis of the subject of our hypo-
thetical suggests that a multilateral approach is usually completely futile
from a practical point of view. 120 Plurilateral measures, while more feasi-
ble to implement than multilateral ones, increase the possibility of effec-
tiveness at the cost of decreasing the likelihood of global acceptance of
coercive measures. The ultimate question is whether any sovereign
ought to be allowed to continue behavior that threatens everyone's sur-
newsletter, or frequent summits, should be bolstered and institutionalized. Such discussion
and familiarization would enable greatly expedited attempts at achieving agreement on a Box
H problem and its cause. This may require the voluntary transfer of scientific data and tech-
niques that may be marginal advances over that already in possession of another lead nation.
The necessity of thus turning to another superpower for support not only increases the likeli-
hood that ultimately effective action will be taken, but also operates as an appropriate and
implicit inhibition on insufficiently justified action in the first place. Working with others oper-
ates to check illegitimate excuses for intervention by raising the political costs. But see D.
Acevedo, Collective Self-Defense and the Use of Regional or Subregional Authority as Justifi-
cation for the Use of Force, Paper delivered at the Proceedings of the 78th Annual Meeting of
the American Society of International Law 69-74 (1984), (addressing, inter alia, The United
Nations Charter and the Use of Force: Is Article 2(4) Still Workable?; the author condemns
that grouping of states that may make the illegitimate seem legitimate).
119. Cf. Bilder, The Role of Unilateral State Action in Preventing International Environ-
mentalInjury, 14 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 51, 90 (1981) ("Multilateral approaches are intrin-
sically more desirable... because of their broad tendency to reinforce collaborative rather
than competitive patterns of international behavior." This seems circular, yet
unobjectionable.).
120. There are times "when multilateral approaches, as a practical matter, are likely to
prove impossible to achieve or ineffective." Id. at 91.
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vival. 121 Shall we allow each sovereign state its own discretion in Box H
matters unless inhibited by an improbable or ponderously achieved com-
mon understanding of a large group of relevant, but themselves
competitive, actors? Perhaps these circumstances require the ordinarily
anathematic unilateral action. 122
Most emphatically, there is no significant and relevant precedent in
modem times for a single superpower 123 exerting significant pressure,
edicts, and control intentions upon countries that are not actively hostile
in the traditional sense.' 24 To explore the potential for the effective
achievement of swift modification of a transgressive country's prevailing
behavior, we could examine potential actions one by one beginning with
the least radical and progressing as far as theory takes us, or we could
examine a potential action maximally coercive and determine that if it is
justifiable then all less coercive acts will be justified under its umbrella.
This article takes the latter course.
Before examining this, however, it would be well to pause and consider
the contextual development of actions taken before the employ of drastic
measures. In reality, of course, ordinarily unjustifiable levels of coercion
would be ill-advised as the opening bid of the technological actor. Since
there are tremendous financial and political costs (both to the actor and
to the target countries) proportional to the degree to which the inertia of
the prevailing international norms is shaken by the actor's actions, it is
preferable to effect the minimum disturbance necessary to achieve the
requisite results. Recognizance of this will necessitate a spectrum of
strategies moving from the less coercive to the more coercive.
IV. The Strategy of Influence: Modalities
Assume that two thresholds of decision have been achieved: advisors
of the technological actor agree in minimum material respects on the
121. Cf. R. ALEXANDER, THE BIOLOGY OF MORAL SYSTMs 180 (1987) (discussing
threatening behavior as seen by biologists and philosophers).
122. The efficacy of unilateral action as an example to be emulated, in either common
territories (like the high seas) or domestic jurisdictions, has been addressed. Bilder, supra note
119. The Bilder article focuses almost entirely on domestic unilateral acts (in the form of
either exemplary behavior or trade policy pressure on foreign states) and on unilateral acts
affecting the global commons (such as an extension of the limit of territorial waters over which
a state claims exclusive jurisdiction).
123. Though this paper intentionally includes the possibility that the technological actor
need not necessarily be a superpower, it appears imperative for even minimum coerciveness
that such an actor must align with a nation of demonstrable power.
124. While creditor nations have joined to manipulate debtor nations, this is distinguish-
able because there is a quid pro quo. This is not so in Box H. By definition, the current
populace of the target country may not receive the direct benefits of any modification of its
behavior.
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nature of the threat, and a target country is isolated as a primary contrib-
utor to the problem (as confidently as, for instance, Japan can be linked
to continued whale hunting). Given that the actor must exercise best
judgment as to the maximum time allowable before changes must be
achieved, what methods of influence are appropriate, and in what se-
quence or combinations?
If actions taken should be those that are minimally destructive or in-
fluential, yet capable of achieving the necessary behavior modification in
a timely fashion, a pattern of influence must commence with minimally
intrusive tactics. It is quite evident that the specific measures to employ
are intensely issue-specific, and cannot be enumerated. Nevertheless, it is
possible to examine the general characteristics of the family, if not the
genus. These manifestations of the intent to persuade may consist of sub-
tly distinct and innumerable combinations of modalities and intensities,
and ultimately will be loosely measured for their aggregate, not individ-
ual, coercive pressure - that is, their cumulative insistence on a persua-
sion continuum that spans insignificant to irresistible. Though employed
in strategic concert, the diplomatic, ideological, economic, and military
modes may be discussed individually.
125
A. The Diplomatic
The diplomatic effort begins with attempts to publicize the technologi-
cal actor's understanding of the Box H problem and to solicit the atten-
tion, comments, agreement, and aid of any governments or non-
governmental. organizations (NGOs). The diplomatic channels extend
from government to government and allow negotiations between the tar-
get country and the technological actor. Negotiations may include self-
policing treaties concerning reductions in Box H-exacerbating behavior.
They may involve mahipulation of the privileges enjoyed by the ambassa-
dors from the iarget countries, and a variety of maneuvers emphasizing
the positive potential of cooperation and negative threat of economic and
military manipulation and utilization. These might take the form, for
example, of everything from ambassadorial insistence and personal con-
frontation to official communiques from the technological actor stressing
intent to achieve change with or without cooperation. Nonrecognition,
too, is an extremely important diplomatic weapon. The diplomatic vehi-
125. It is important to recognize at the outset that the four modes are overlapping, not
coterminous, on a scale measuring degrees of coercion. Thus, high-level diplomatic action
may have greater power of persuasion than low-level military action. See Constitutive Process,
supra note 5, at 258.
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cle alone, however, is unlikely to be successful, but will prove valuable in
laying the groundwork for justifying any later heightened coercion.
B. The Ideological
The ideological effort is designed to extend directly from the organized
plurality to the masses of the target country. The intention is to influ-
ence popular perspectives in the target country as well as in other states
with direct appeals to the masses via television, radio broadcasts, news-
papers, and rumors. Such propaganda is a particularly powerful force
for eroding support of governments and encouraging behavior modifica-
tion. It is, perhaps, so strong an influence precisely because it is a
method easily overlooked. 126 A strategy employing versatile ideological
influence targeted at both pressure groups and the populace at large may
have considerable success at altering beliefs and attitudes which are ob-
stacles to curtailing the injurious activities. Again, this tool may achieve
limited success, but will likely need buttressing by other methods.
C. The Economic
Constructive economic programs could involve sacrifice of receivables
(perhaps in the form of "resource for debt-reduction" swaps), direct sub-
sidies that accelerate common understanding of the problem (such as
grants, services, and facilities for education and research), direct subsi-
dies to aid governmental modification of people's behavior, 127 and ma-
126. Cross-border ideological influence can be sufficiently threatening to a government
that it has been the subject of bilateral treaties, numerous discussions in the United Nations,
and a number of draft conventions. See generally B. MURTY, PROPAGANDA AND WORLD
PUBLIC ORDER: THE LEGAL REGULATION OF THE IDEOLOGICAL INSTRUMENT OF COER-
CION (1968); L. MARTIN, INTERNATIONAL PROPAGANDA (1958); PROPAGANDA: TOWARDS
DISARMAMENT IN THE WAR OF WORDS (J. Whitton & A. Larson eds. 1963); Constitutive
Process, supra note 5, at 262-64. The Charter of the Organization of American States recog-
nizes this means of influence as potentially hostile intervention. Charter of the Organization of
American States, arts. 15, 16, Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394, T.I.A.S. 2361, 119 U.N.T.S. 48.
As an example, the Convention Concerning the Use of Broadcasting in the Cause of Peace,,
arts. 1-3, Sept. 23, 1936, 186 L.N.T.S. 301, forbids signatories from broadcasting statements
disruptive of the internal order of any contracting party, constituting an incitement to war, or
harmful to "good international understanding" because of "statements of incorrectness." See
also Falk, On Regulating International Propaganda: A Plea for Moderate Aims, 31 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 622-34 (1986). A number of governments are currently finding the prolifer-
ation and availability of transborder video tapes, for example, particularly disturbing. Videos
have been blamed from Kenya to Muslim countries to Viet Nam for a breakdown in the
morals of youth and general degradation of religious and cultural values. The effect of video
footage from the fronts has boosted morale of rebels in Burma and generated concern for the
Mujahedin in Afghanistan. Subversion by Cassette: The VCR Boom Spells Trouble forAuthor-
itarian Regimes, TIME, Sept. 11, 1989, at 80.
127. To illustrate, President Johnson offered vast sums of money and services to North
Vietnam. Johnson Hints atAidforAsia if Strike Ends, N.Y. Times, Mar. 26, 1965, at I, col. 1;
President Offers to Start Vietnam Talks Unconditionally, N.Y. Times, Apr. 8, 1965, at 1, col. 5.
243
Yale Journal of International Law
nipulation of trade balances and currency exchange in favor of target
countries. Such positive economic activity may also take the form' of
financial support for favorable political parties or insurgent groups and
other organizations within target countries that are politically sympa-
thetic and internally influential. Even outright bribery of powerful
figures128 is advisable if massive domestic changes are necessary to fore-
stall a Box H problem. None of these, though, is likely to be continu-
ously effective, as the target countries have an incentive to threaten to
resume earlier behavior in order to extort increasing benefits from the
technological actor. Moreover, such financial aid might cause indigna-
tion within the technological actor at having to compensate a target
deemed culpable.
Because the statistical effects of the economy are more easily quantified
and tabulated than are diplomatic or ideological gains and losses, it is
possible to examine economic sanctions in somewhat greater detail. Eco-
nomic sanctions 129 have been used in time of war, for political
destabilization, on behalf of efforts to protect human rights, to halt nu-
clear proliferation, to settle expropriation claims, and to combat interna-
tional terrorism.130 But do they work? Even multilateral economic
sanctions are commonly unsuccessful, and may be inappropriate as a Box
H remedy.131 The obstacles to successful imposition of economic sanc-
tions are manifold. Initially, the decision to implement sanctions in the
form of a prohibition of imports, license restrictions, a reduction of ex-
ports, curtailed extensions of credit, currency dilutions, product dump-
ing, or some permutation of these is extraordinarily difficult. Even
carefully formulated policies can create their own antidotes, actually
128. - For a thoughtful and controversial view of the role of bribery in society, see W. M.
REISMAN, FOLDED LIES: BRIBERY, CRUSADES, AND REFORMS (1979).
129. Article 41 of the U.N. Charter specifically allows that such sanctions may be appro-
priate: "The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force
are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the
United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of
economic relations."
130. G. HUFBAUER & J. SCHOTT, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED: HISTORY AND
CURRENT POLICY 6 (1985) [hereinafter G. HUFBAUER & J. SCHOTr, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
RECONSIDERED]. The book is a comprehensive and sophisticated analysis of 103 instances,
since 1914, of economic sanctions for foreign policy purposes. The study was undertaken to
inform the debate whether and how to use sanctions, and eloquently manifests their nearly
universal failure. See also G. HUFBAUER & J. SCHO'r, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS IN SUPPORT
OF FOREIGN POLICY GOALS (1983).
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backlashing by unifying the target country and increasing its self-
reliance. 
1 32
In most cases, the difficulties in successfully achieving changes in the
policies of foreign governments result in more annoyance than hardship
for the targeted state. While the overall success rate for simple, modest
policy changes is barely ,40%, according to two scholars, 133 the likeli-
hood of any major policy change, such as the one necessary in a hypo-
thetical Box H problem, is less than 20%. Consequently many
commentators and politicians do not consider economic sanctions to be
an "effective weapon of political warfare."' 134 Thus, while they may have
some effect over very short or very protracted periods, they should not be
relied upon, alone, to produce necessary changes when problems of irre-
versibility, universality, and time-lag loom. Again, a multi-tool effort is
necessary.
132. Countries party to the sanctions may maintain superficial adherence to the policies,
but may, through public or private channels, leak goods to the target. Nonimposing countries
may simply step in to replace the restricted supply, gaining trade profits and influence, and
diluting the effects of the sanctions. Target countries themselves may actually experience me-
dium-term economic gains by repudiating foreign debt, or, as Egypt and Cuba did, by simply
expropriating assets of the imposing country. The country imposing sanctions may thus both
directly and indirectly damage its own economy via lost business, assets, raw materials, export
opportunities, and employment. Needless to say, this tends, to undercutpopular support. Mi-
nor sanctions are "virtually certain to produce reverse political effect without exerting any real
pressure." R. RENWICK, ECONOMIC SANCTiONS 92 (1981). The more coercive sanctions self-
inflict major damage. In addition, humanitarian concerns often reveal that sanctions most
frequently injure the common citizens far more than the political elite. Though sanctions are,
if at all, successful only over protracted periods, the problems enumerated are exacerbated over
time, resulting in waning support in both domestic and international fora.
Historically, even concerted efforts such as those focused on Italy and Rhodesia have been
largely ineffective. Efforts of 50 member states of the League of Nations, the first great eco-
nomic sanction attempt, were unable to prevent Mussolini from conquering Abyssinia. Id. at
9-24. In the second grand attempt, beginning in 1965, fourteen years of sanctions were leveled
against Rhodesia. For quite a number of years these actually yielded a benefit to Rhodesia; it
simply defaulted on its debt, and was one of the world's boom economies in the early 1970s in
spite of intensified sanctions. Throughout this period, Rhodesia needed only one major sup-
plier, South Africa, to resist the pressure of sanctions. Consequent to the reciprocal effect of
sanctions on commercial prices in the targeting states, the United States was the first formally
to break the Rhodesian sanctions. Id. at 25-58.
133. G. HUFBAUER & J. SCHoTr, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED, supra note
130, at 82.
134. Friedman, Economic Sanctions, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 21, 1980, at 76; see also M.
DAOUDI & M. DAJANI, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: IDEALS AND EXPERIENCE 159 (1983) ("The
history of sanctions has led some observers to conclude that sanctions are 'ineffective,' or at
best 'symbolic'; on historical grounds, current social science tends to discredit the idea, domi-
nant in the 1920s and 1930s, that sanctions constitute an effective coercive weapon in interna-
tional politics."). Id. at 43-50, App. II; D. LOSMAN, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
128 (1979) (economic sanctions were "unsuccessful in each of the cases studied, despite target
economies being relatively small and highly vulnerable").
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D. The Military
The potential involvement of the military instrument spans the range
of increasingly coercive participation. The effective use of the military
may include all levels of muscle from harassment, disruption, or seizure
of international vessels and air traffic, "gunboat diplomacy," covert oper-
ations and sabotage to assassination, invasion, and belligerent occupa-
tion. Given the high costs to all parties of military intervention, military
action is justified only when the alternative is likely to be worse.
The technological actor should clearly explore these modalities, survey
possible and specific objectives 135 and decide upon a strategy employing
the least forceful means of international intervention. Though the evolv-
ing relationship between target and actor will require constant reassess-
ment, the combinations of sequences and intensities employed should
begin with measures minimally disruptive and proceed incrementally at a
speed proportional to best estimates .of available time, until they achieve
a necessary stasis or reversal of deleterious behavior.
135. The logical and necessary complement to a discussion of modalities of influence is a
discussion of objectives of influence; a proper strategy of influence requires both methods (as
discussed above) and objectives. Having taken quick inventory of the tools available to the
technological actor, toward what end should they be employed? Although a full examination
of objectives is beyond the scope of this article, the following proposed taxonomic structure
allows systematic identification and evaluation of all possible objectives. The structure identi-
fies needs and preferences of the target and is intended to locate vulnerabilities.
The reification process here proposed separates the choice of objective into five separate
decisions. To the Kingdom of international relations and the contextual Phylum of Box H
problems, these five separate decisions provide the Class, Order, Family, Genus, and Species,
the particular combination of which will positively identify a particular objective.
The first decision addresses the Temporal Element: on what stage of the various political
and economic machinations of the target country will action focus? Since all behavior is in-
tended to yield a benefit, the technological actor can disrupt the effort/reward cycle of the
target country's behavior at either some time during Benefit Generation (actions intended to
yield benefits) or during Benefit Realization (realization of those benefits). Second, the Interac-
tion Element: will effective action target the principally Internal activities of a nation, or its
External relationship with other countries? Third, the Audience Element: shall action target
the Populace, or Governing Individuals in effective power? Fourth, the Relatedness Element:
shall the coercion focus on the Particular activity or closely related behavior, or should the
coercion focus on Unrelated activities? Fifth, and finally, the Aiming Element: shall action
target Humans directly, or indirectly through their necessity and luxury Material Goods?
A moment's reflection will show that this T.I.A.R.A. construct, a categorizing circumscrip-
tion of the decisional process, yields a range of 24 genotypic objectives from which the techno-
logical actor may choose. It describes logical possibilities without respect to the preferences
that an applied value system will establish.
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V. Lawfulness: Extraterritorial Unilateral Coercion and the
International Prescriptive Process
Concerned with the global community's perceptions, should the tech-
nological actor attempt to establish the legality of its actions, and if so,
how? The decision whether or not to cloak the actions Box H problems
may require in the trappings of legality is more complex than it at first
appears. On the one hand, the technological actor may develop a sophis-
ticated model tending to establish that its actions are legal within recog-
nizable international law doctrines., This has the benefit of buttressing
the conception that actors must recognize certain rules and limitations,
without highlighting the actor's transgression of them. On the other
hand, the technological actor may proclaim that its actions are most cer-
tainly illegal, but justified and necessary given the unprecedented and
extreme threat of the Box H problem. This approach has the benefit of
admitting that in dire circumstances rtional people may ignore law,
without warping traditional notions of legality. This has the marked dis-
advantages, however, of appearing hypocritical and confusingly unlaw-
ful, and of setting dangerous precedent aswell.'
The principal focus should be on the effect such justification, or its
absence, will have on the expectations and future behavior of other global
players, with particular attention to the benefits or disadvantages to ac-
crue to the technological actor as a consequence thereof. Intuition and a
concern for reputation suggest that, given a choice, one should try to
appear law-abiding whenever it is not in one's overwhelming interest to
act otherwise. Though this may sometimes require political gymnastics,
a world of interdependents requires attention to international diplomatic
and economic relationships, and the extent to which these may be under-
mined by flagrant transgressions of the international community's
expectations. 136
136. Thus, it is not at all quixotic to consider cloaking the actions in the garb of near-
traditional legal concepts; though the fabric may need to be tugged and stretched, even ab-
stract similarities to the famili.ar may palliate, subdue, or delay hostile international response.
The proliferation of game theorists reflects the importance of ongoing interactions and the
effect of today's behavior on the realization of predictable future desires. Nevertheless, this
concern may plausibly lead to two quite different conclusions: while the technological actor's
,.new" interpretation of more traditional legal values may benefit it (or at least not damage it)
in its direct interaction with other countries, it may receive greater indirect damage to its
economic or political ambitions when other. countries increase their internationally coercive
behavior commensurate with the "newly" proclaimed legality. Thus attempting to establish a
legal argument for one's coercive response to a Box H threat may warp, deform, and do irre-
mediable violence to the international legal system. Attention to the costs of this eventuality
are as important as they are difficult to compute.
247
Yale Journal of International Law
Conversely, the costs of the alternative, reaffirming the traditional
legal norms while claiming that unique circumstances justify their fla-
grant transgression, are relatively obvious, and the benefits are more sub-
tle. These benefits, for example, must have motivated the extreme
caution with which Israel and the United States handled the Israeli raid
at Entebbe. The United States representatives in the U.N. Security
Council shrewdly and emphatically pronounced the unending need to
protect and sustain the ideals of "sovereignty" and "territorial integrity"
of states and attempted to limit the precedential value of the act to the
"exceptional" and "unique" circumstances of the situation, much as a
judge might limit his opinion to only "the facts of this case." 137
While the true nature of such an act is not as protean as its professed
justification may be, the very process of asserting a justification necessar-
ily reflects and reciprocally encourages the belief that justifications "mat-
ter" in some transcendent sense, and that the decisionmaking processes
and behavior of countries are profoundly influenced by them. Mainte-
nance of the myth that there is a congruence of the "legal" thing to do
and the "right" thing to do provides a valuable normative circumscrip-
tion of both domestic and international behavior. Yet sophisticated ac-
tors, in operation, self-consciously preserve a distinction between the
legal and the right, acknowledging that certain acts are inherently dan-
gerous and volatile but occasionally appropriate. 138 The statistical inci-
dence of the appropriate occasion to break the law is deemed to be so low
as to justify the existence of the rule excluding the act from legitimacy,
while allowing that the sophisticated may transgress, and hoping and as-
suming that the sophisticated will be sufficiently cognizant of the poten-
tially enormous ramifications of such an act that recognition may serve
to inhibit the act and ensure that its occasion remains within acceptable
limits. The acknowledgment of the act's illegality is in part an effort to
reaffirm on the ideological level, and to reassure peripheral groups of, the
continuing validity of the norm system just transgressed. 139
The best one can conclude, taking as axiomatic that some justification
is preferable to no justification, is that the decision to justify with legal or
137. J. MURPHY, LEGAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: SUMMARY REPORT
OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE 20 (1978); LEGAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TER-
RORISM 558 (A. Evans & J. Murphy eds. 1978). But see M. McDougal & W. M. Reisman,
Letter, to the Editor of the N.Y. Times, reproduced in LEGAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL
TERRORISM, supra, at 559-60 (arguing for bolder, self-vindicating approach).
138. On a more familiar level, we might prefer, for example, not to scrutinizepost hoc the
behavior of a police officer threatening an apprehended kidnapper in order to learn the location
of a 14 year-old victim, and yet emphatically not wish to make threatening of arrestees legal.
This tacit dualism is clearly reflected in the policy allowing prosecutorial discretion.
139. See generally REISMAN, FOLDED LIES, supra note 128.
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extra-legal arguments is not to be taken lightly. Nevertheless, there
should be a rebuttable presumption in favor of legal arguments. First,
since international relationships are shaped precisely by expectancies of
reasonable and probable behavior, claiming to conform with legal theo-
ries (or not unreasonable extrapolations of them) is more likely to pre-
serve and contribute to a methodic evolution of international order than
if the contrary obtained. Second, and independently, the technological
actor should prefer legal arguments whenever it has in the past criticized
extra-legal justifications, or espoused the inherent virtue of the legal over
the nonlegal. This is not because legality is ontologically superior to non-
legality, but rather because in a world of interdependents and distrust, it
more often than not will benefit a society to be consistent and to have
rhetoric and behavior conform. 14° Both legal and extra-legal justifica-
tions are explored in the following sections.
Coercive unilateral action in the international arena may assume many
forms: aggressive debt reclamation, nationalization/expropriation, mili-
tary force or threat of force, varying levels of economic sanctions, physi-
cal quarantining, etc. Because this paper explores a worst-case scenario,
a true Box H threat, it seeks the maximum action justifiable when recog-
nizing the peculiar conjunction of irreversibility, universality, and time-
lag. In such a case, both legal and extra-legal justifications may be avail-
able, as discussed herein.
One cannot impose the template of domestic law-making upon the in-
ternational forum. Analogues to Congress, statutes, or court systems
backed by executive power do not exist. Since an unenforceable "law" in
the field of international law is merely an ideal, the question of lawfulness
is reducible to "what are the expectations of what is right held by the
politically relevant actors?"'141 International law, therefore, is found in
previous acts as well as in multilateral agreements of various kinds.142
Importantly, precedential acts and documentary guidelines may be in-
consistent, confounding analysis.
A circular element thus inheres in the definitional process of interna-
tional law. Law is, in part, custom. 143 This fact legitimates most of what
140. The contrary can be true, however, if a society has cultivated a reputation for being
consistently and predictably contradictory in word and deed, or if other elites are regularly
inconsistent.
141. See sources cited supra note 5.
142. Id.; see also Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)? or: Changing Norms Governing the Use
of Force by States, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 809, 835-36 (1970) (according legislative role to practice
of dominant states) [hereinafter Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)?].
143. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1)b, 59 Stat.1055, T.S. No. 993
(1945) (see infra note 157 for text).
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has already been done, and consigns innovative action to an awkward
conceptual hinterland where the opinions of world neighbors have not
yet had cause to venture. Nonetheless, innovative action, if perpetrated
without significant and tangible reprisal, may become part of the body of
custom, largely as a function of continued international acquiescence or
imitation and the passage of time.144 The consequences of certain innova-
tive actions may be assessed in terms of three sets of variables: 1) the
participant's expectations of lawfulness prior to the incident; 2) the reac-
tions of the international community to the incident; and 3) the impact of
the incident upon previously identified norms. 145 Unfortunately, little
data is available to guide the analysis of legality of an action such as the
Box.H problem requires. Nor can we turn for guidance to the subject of
the hypothetical; as recently as a decade ago, concern about accountabil-
ity for transfrontier environment-threatening behavior was focused either
on intentional manipulation of the environment (environmental warfare),
or on new "projects" that had significant environmental consequences.
No significant focus on existing or future environmental damage as a by-
product of certain human activities occurred. When it was considered, it
was only in the context of valuation and compensation. 146 Thus, to learn
more about possible justifications we must go beyond the norms bearing
directly on the subject of the hypothetical.
A. Legal Justifications
1. Documentary Sources of Law
Generally, reasonable democratic governments provide for swift exec-
utive action when consensus building and pre-action legitimation are im-
practical. This is no less necessary in the international arena. The most
extreme action contemplated in the Box H context is injunctive, and, one
hopes, retroactively justifiable, whether legally or not. An appropriate
metaphor is the emergency brake on trains. Nonrepresentative individu-
als are allowed, in fact encouraged, to exercise their own subjective as-
sessment of danger - even though there is a high possibility of
unintended cost or harm. Presumably, the likelihood of being identified
and the consequent imperative to justify the incident are sufficient deter-
rent to injudicious acts.
To examine the maximum action justifiable to confront Box H, we
must begin at the end, by addressing the final state of affairs to which
144. See sources cited supra note 5.
145." Willard, Incidents: An Essay in Method, in INTERNATIONAL INCIDENTS, supra note
5, at 34.
146. See generally SCHACHTER, RESOURCES, supra note 110.
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appropriate action may necessarily resolve: the use of force. Many com-
mentators believe that broadly accepted international norms, whether in
the United Nations Charter, the United Nations Declaration on Coloni-
alism, 147 the United Nations Declarations on Non-Intervention, 148 or an
extensive array of other international instruments and precedents, now
clearly prohibit a nation from using force to acquire or prescribe the use
of another nation's territory or resources. 149 In a world of power blocs
and alliances, it is argued, practical political concerns and fears of esca-
lation buttress those norms.
The United Nations Charter contains several relevant provisions.
Many feel that, primafacie, the use of force in violation of Article 2(4) is
clearly inconsistent with international law. Article 2(4) states:
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations.150
One of the stated "Purposes" of the United Nations is "[t]o maintain
international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collec-
tive measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and
for the suppression of acts of aggression ... in conformity with theprinci-
ples ofjustice and international law . ... "1"I Any of the coercive or in-
junctive actions arguably necessary in the context of the hypothetical
herein elaborated would thus seem to violate Article 2(4); they are-
clearly intended to reduce the transgressive country's freedom to damage
others by purely internal policies and actions, and thus to reduce its
"lOlitical independence." Nevertheless, Article 2(4) is arguably inconsis-
tent, and either the drafting or bright line interpretation is indicative of
insufficient vision. By incorporating the "Purposes" of the United Na-
tions, Article 2(4) implicitly and erroneously assumes that large-scale
147. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,
G.A. Res. 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960).
148. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Cooperation Among States, G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121, U.N. Doc.
A/8028 (1970); Declaration on Inadmissibility of Intervention, G.A. Res. 2131, 20 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 14) at 11, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965).
149. There is abundant material on what is and what is not "use of force," and in what
circumstances it should be used. See generally Restraints on the Unilateral Use of Force: A
Colloquy, 10 YALE J. INT'L L. 261 (1985) (essays of Falk, Gordon, Reisman, Rostow and
Schachter); Schachter, Armed Force, supra note 108; Schachter, In Defense of International
Rules on the Use of Force, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 113 (1986); Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)?,
supra note 142; Henkin, The Reports of the Death of Article 2(4) are Greatly Exaggerated, 65
AM. J. INT'L L. 544 (1971).
150. U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. 4 (emphasis added).
151. Id. at art. 1, para. 1. (emphasis added).
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collective measures are always possible when truly necessary and are su-
perior to unilateral measures.
152
Would actions taken for what the technological actor subjectively be-
lieves (as in the hypothetical) to be the preservation of both internal and
global stability be acts of "aggression"? The definition of "aggression,"
as used in the "Purposes," was clarified in the U.N. Definition of Aggres-
sion Resolution of 1974153 which states, essentially, that aggression con-
stitutes "armed force" (or anything else the Security Council, pursuant
to article 39 of the Charter, says that it means). Article 5(1) of the Reso-
lution states: "No consideration of whatever nature, whether political,
economic, military, or otherwise, may serve as a justification for aggres-
sion." 154 The problem for the hypothetical and other Box H crises is that
while the actions would not be motivated by thoughts of conquest or
complete domination, it is quite difficult to view them as viably within a
traditional "self-defense" argument. A use of force as a response to the
hypothetical problem certainly conforms to no current notion of defen-
sive action, largely because the United Nations' parochial sense of self-
defense tenaciously incorporates a dysfunctionally rigid requirement of
hostility, immediacy of harm, and its emanation from a single source.
The bright line, however, between "aggression" and defense fades
quickly in a more complex world. Thus while it is perhaps pleasant to
have single rules with absolute prohibitions, Article 2(4)'s incorporation
of the Purposes' definition of aggression clearly reveals a lack of imagina-
tion and a lack of valid applicability. It should not, therefore, be consid-
ered applicable to certain unprecedented Box H circumstances.
Article 2 of the 1974 U.N. Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of
States contains another relevant provision:
Every state has and shall freely exercise full permanent sovereignty, includ-
ing possession, use and disposal, over all its wealth, natural resources, and
economic activities.'
55
152. Cf. Reisman, Criteria for the Lawful Use of Force in International Law, 10 YALE J.
INT'L L. 279, 283 (1985) (criticizing other assumptions necessary for bright line interpretation
of 2(4)).
153. G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975).
154. Id. at art. 5(1).
155. G.A. Res. 3281,29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1974). Cf.
Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 1803, 17 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 15, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962) (concerning "[tihe right of peoples
and nations to permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources"). For a sum-
mary of the foregoing, see 1962 UNITED NATIONS Y.B. 498-504. For further discussion, see
Schachter, Armed Force, supra note 108; ARSANJANI, INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF IN-
TERNAL RESOURCES: A STUDY OF LAW AND POLICY (1981); Reisman, The Third World's
Fading Dream, THE NATION, June 12, 1976, at 716.
252
Vol. 15:207, 1990
The Box H Problem
Again, coercive measures taken by a technological actor against a trans-
gressive country for its refusal to make its behavior less disastrously dam-
aging would clearly violate the "free exercise" of the sovereign use of its
natural resources, which clearly constitute both an "economic activity"
and "wealth."
Our inquiry is further assisted by several explicit provisions of the
Charter of the Organization of American States:
Article 15. No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly
or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of
any other State. The foregoing principle prohibits not only armed force but
also any otherforr of interference or attempted threat against the personal-
ity of the State or against its political, economic, and cultural elements.
Article 16. No State may use or encourage the use of coercive measures of
an economic or political character in order to force the sovereign will of
another State and obtain from it advantages of any kind.
Article 17. The territory of a State is inviolable; it may not be the object,
even temporarily, of military occupation or of other measures of force taken
by another State, directly or indirectly, on any grounds whatever .... 156
International action inconsistent with these provisions may appear ille-
gal. Quite clearly this convention casts a net so wide that any form of
pressure, including economic, is prohibited interference whether direct or
indirect "for any reason whatever" or "on any grounds whatever." To
the extent to which article 38(l)(b) of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice 157 commonly informs an analysis of legality, however,
an apparent violation of treaties like those mentioned above is "illegal"
only to the extent that it is manifestly inconsistent with previous interna-
tional activities. The technological actor turns elsewhere, then, seeking
avenues of approbation for unilateral action.
2. Precedent and Legal Justification for Coercive International Action:
Self-Defense and International Concern
Precedent may consist of either a similar action, or of international
response to a similar action. While there are precedents for action in
self-defense, and even anticipatory self-defense, there are no precedents
156. O.A.S. Charter, supra note 126 (emphasis added).
157. Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 143, art. 38(1) states: "The
Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are
submitted to it, shall apply: (a) international conventions, whether general or particular, es-
tablishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states; (b) international custom, as evi-
dence of a general practice accepted as law; (c) the general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations; (d) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings
of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations as subsidiary means for the deter-
mination of rules of law."
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for action justified by the principle of superior scientific knowledge of
Box H crises or planet-threatening activities. Nevertheless there have
been a number of instances of coercive force in which relevant elites have
acquiesced. In addition to self-defense claims, actions to promote self-
determination, decolonialization, and certain humanitarian interventions
have received fairly broad elite support.158
It is important to note that those actions not "supported" by the world
community may not necessarily be "opposed" in any significant sense.
For example, the U.N. Security Council has been so paralyzed by intrac-
table conflicts that unilateral violations of article 2(4) have frequently
received little more than public condemnation. 159 A broad survey of inci-
dents suggests that such condemnation is proportional to the "reasona-
bleness" of the act, assessed with respect to the appropriateness of the
act, to the nature of the threat, and the duration of intervention. Addi-
tional criteria for evaluating potential acts of a technological actor shall
be proposed below.
Although a number of factors seem to indicate the illegality of unilat-
eral, and even plurilateral, injunctive force, a number of treaties and the-
ories, also constituent of international law arguably attest to the legality
of such action. While perceptions of legality are only one factor among
many to consider in the- analysis of a proposed action, claims to legiti-
macy are important in justifying actions to an acting state's own citizens,
and to countries whose support or acquiescence is desired.160 Represen-
tative "self-defense" and "international concern" norms offer viable legal
justification for coercion as a remedy to the hypothetical and. are ex-
plored below. Each section will first examine existing norms, and then
propose an analysis by which they may justify the hypothetical, and per-
haps Box H problems in general.
a. Self Defense and Terrorism: Existing Norms
The self-defense justification1 6 sometimes arises in the context of a
state's efforts to protect its nationals abroad1 62 and in the context of di-
158. More controversial are such things as contribution to the replacement of individuals
in governments, gathering of evidence in international proceedings, and international judg-
ment enforcement. Reisman, Article 2(4): The Use of Force in Contemporary International
Law, 78 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 74, 79-84 (1984).
159. Id. at 77.
160. Id.
161. See generally D. BowETr, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1958); Mc-
Dougal, The Soviet-Cuban Quarantine and Self-Defense, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 597 (1963) [here-
inafter McDougal, Self-Defense]; Brownlie, The Use of Force in Self-Defence, 37 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 183 (1961).
162. Examples of such efforts include the Belgian action in Stanleyville in 1961, the United
States actions in the Dominican Republic in 1965, the rescue effort of Israel in Entebbe in
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rect efforts to combat terrorism.163 Anticipatory or preemptive self-de-
fense is even more controversial. In 1981, the United Nations and many
governments harshly rejected Israel's claim of a right to anticipatory self-
defense in its bombing of an Iraqi nuclear reactor. 64 It is certainly argua-
ble, however, that the use of armed force to preempt terrorist acts is not a
use of force directed against the "territorial integrity or political indepen-
dence of another state." While this may clear the Article 2(4) hurdle,
though, such action may still be inconsistent with the Purposes of the
Charter, 165 and there have been numerous authoritative condemnations
of anticipatory self-defense.'
66
In spite of these hurdles, significant players continue efforts to carve
out a preemptive act exception to Article 2(4). For example, former Sec-
retary of State George Shultz asserted:
It is absurd to argue that international law prohibits us from capturing ter-
rorists in international waters or airspace, from attacking them on the soil
of other nations... or from using force against states that support, train,
and harbor terrorists or guerrillas.
167
1976, the attempt of the United States in 1980 to free hostages in Iran, and the "rescue" of
Americans in Grenada in 1983.
1 163. See eg., Roberts, Self-Help in Combatting State-Sponsored Terrorism:" Self-Defense
and Peacetime Reprisals, 19 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 243 (1987). Recent examples include
the Oct. 10, 1985 interception of a commercial Egyptian airplane carrying four members of the
Palestine Liberation Front by the United States, and Israel's Feb. 3, 1986 interception of a
Libyan executive jet thought to have top Palestinian leaders on board. There is debate con-
cerning whether the United States action was a justifiable use of force under article 2(4) as a
countermeasure consequent to an alleged Egyptian breach of obligations under the Interna-
tional Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 4, 1979, G.A. Res. 34/146, 34 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 46), U.N. Doc. A/34/46, reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 1456 (1979). Some com-
mentators argue that the action was clearly unjustifiable and violative of international norms,
notwithstanding the fact that Canada, Great Britain, Israel, Switzerland, West Germany, and
the Soviet Union all released statements ranging from very positive to generally supportive.
Many U.S. Allies Applaud Move, But Some Question Its Legality, N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1985, at
A7, col. 1; From Soviets, Sympathy and a Barb for U.S., id., at A7, col. 5. The Israeli action,
on the other hand, received strong negative responses. It was considered unreasonable. On
examination this seems attributable to, among other political factors, the inadequacy and inac-
curacy of the Israeli intelligence information, the great haste with which the decision to inter-
cept was made, and the action's lack of justification on the grounds of retaliation for specific
acts. See G. Borkowski, Use of Force. Interception ofAircraft, 27 HARV. INT'L L. J. 761, 762-,
64 (1986). The U.S. interception, in contrast, was in the aftermath of the Oct. 7 hijacking of
the Italian cruise liner Achille Lauro, in which a U.S. citizen was executed, and Palestine
Liberation Front members responsible for the hijacking were known to be aboard the inter-
cepted plane.
164. See Paust, Responding Lawfully to International Terrorism: The Use of Force Abroad,
8 WHrTTIER L. REV. 711 (1986).
165. See Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)?, supra note 142.
166. See generally Paust, supra note 164, at 717 n.21.
167. G. Shultz, Low-Intensity Warfare: The Challenge of Ambiguity, address to the Na-
tional Defense University (Jan. 15, 1986), reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 204 (1986). This highly con-
troversial "Shultz Doctrine" also stated: "A nation attacked by terrorists is permitted to use
force to prevent orpreempt future attacks, to seize terrorists, or to rescue its citizens, when no
other means is available." Id. at 206 (emphasis added).
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The U.S. attack of five targets in Libyan territory in 1986 was justified, in
part, by such arguments for preemptive self-defense. 168 Though anticipa-
tory strikes remain hotly debated, on balance they are considered imper-
missible and violative of predominant expectations.
169
What values seem to predict the reactions of the international commu-
nity to these various forms of self-defense? In the case of the rescue ef-
forts, the use of force was criticized as a violation of territorial
sovereignty, but jurists and many governments accepted a general legal
justification for such use of force based upon at least: 1) an emergency
need to save lives of nationals, and 2) nonderogation of "territorial integ-
rity or political independence" of the state in whose territory the action
occurred. 170 The reaction to the United States and Israeli retaliatory ef-
forts clearly shows that force may be permitted consequent to breaches of
international obligations, but must result from reliable information, stra-
tegic execution, and, most particularly, a specifically identified act to
which the force responds. From the governmental and United Nations
condemnations of anticipatory acts, like the bombing of the Iraqi reactor,
one can infer that if a right to such action exists, it resides only when
attack is imminent and when there is little time for deliberation. In
short, for both retaliatory and preemptive acts, legitimacy is inextricably
linked to the larger community's perceptions of reasonableness, which
examines necessity, imminence, and proportionality.
171
b. Application of Existing Norms to the Hypothetical
Although there is little room at the moment for a solution to the hypo-
thetical, or Box H problems in general, within the context of acting in a
way that would satisfy other countries' notions of legitimacy under the
traditional criteria, perhaps a justification for the use of force might lie in
a reconceptualization of the necessary meaning of words within relevant
provisions of the Charter. 172 Article 51 of the U.N. Charter allows the
168. See, eg., Televised statement of President Reagan, Apr. 14, 1986, reprinted in Rea-
gan: We Have Done What We Had To Do, Wash. Post, Apr. 15, 1986, at A23, col. 3; see also
Administration Acts on 'Self-Defense'Principle Espoused by Shultz, Wash. Post, Apr. 15, 1986,
at A20, col. 1. One scholar suggests that anticipatory self-defense would be allowable and
preferable in cases of "a distant future threat of actual attack" if only there were a way to
minimize the chance of mistake and inflict less damage than if the coercion were postponed.
Zedalis, Preliminary Thoughts on Some Unresolved Questions Involving the Law of Anticipatory
Self-Defense, 19 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 129, 144-47 (1987).
169. Paust, supra note 164, at 719.
170. Schachter, Armed Force, supra note 108, at 1629.
171. See generally Schachter, The Lawful Resort to Unilateral Use of Force, 10 YALE J.
INT'L L. 291 (1985).
172. Cf. Bilder, supra note 119. While Bilder acknowledges, in passing, that it is possible
to conceive of environmental situations in which self-defense may apply (such as the explosion
of a test nuclear device exposing another country to lethal radiation), he would prefer not to
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use of force in cases of self-defense to "armed attack." A transfrontier
use of force would certainly require a reinterpretation of "armed attack"
to be justifiable. 173 "Armed" need not mean missiles (rather than the log-
ging apparatus or torches of the hypothetical), and an "attack" can be an
incremental and slow yet gravely disruptive assault (as the hypothetical
is, and Box H problems will tend to be).174 As a corollary of the self-
defense justification, a state damaged by another state's breach of a treaty
concerning environmental or transfrontier disruption may have a legiti-
mate use of force claim. The EnMod Treaty, 175 for example, essentially
prohibits the "hostile" use of "environmental modification techniques"
having "widespread, long-lasting or severe effects." 176 To expand the ap-
plicability of this provision, one commentator has suggested expanding
"hostile" to include "any hostile environmental manipulation that could
be reasonably expected to result in a prohibited effect even if the environ-
mental modification was not meant as the primary form of the attack."'
177
Our concern for applicability to the hypothetical suggests that "hostile"
be stretched even further. Some meaning of "hostility" as follows would
allow likely Box H problems to come within the scope of the EnMod
Treaty: the failure swiftly to effect a near-total cessation of specified be-
allow such a dangerous-extension of the defense doctrine unless it were at least limited to
circumstances in which the action defended a) would appear reasonable to the international
community, b) would at least allege prevention of immediate harm, and c) would result in only
little or no adverse effect on the offending nation or other nations. Id. at 71-72. None of these
requirements is present in the hypothetical posited herein, and certainly not in Box H
problems generally.
173. But see Kahn, From Nuremburg to the Hague: The United States Position in Nicara-
gua v. United States and the Development of International Law, 12 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 21
(1987) (Professor Kahn states: "To find an armed attack is to find authorization for a military
response.... Packed into a determination that an 'armed attack' has occurred are many of the
most important functions of an international legal order. It is not a determination that should
be made lightly."). Cf Kwakwa, South Africa's May 1986 Military Incursions Into Neighbor-
ing States, 12 YALE J. INT'L L. 421, 442 (1987) (author concludes that support to opposition
groups can be violative of non-intervention principles but is not an "armed attack" and that
therefore only non-military response is allowable).
Of course, reinterpretation is not the province of U.S. scholars alone. Scholars from other
countries have their own entrenched views on the necessity of interpreting the language of art.
2(4) and art. 51 in its plainest sense. See, e.g., J. SINGH, USE OF FORCE UNDER INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 9-31 (1984) (Faculty of Law, University of Delhi).
174. Indeed one authority indicates that, "[i]n broadest formulation, this right of self-de-
fense, as established by traditional practice, authorizes a state which, being the target of activi-
ties by another state, reasonably decides, as third-party observers may determine
reasonableness, that such activities imminently require it to employ the military instrument to
protect its territorial integrity and political independence, to use such force as may be neces-
sary and proportionate for securing its defense." McDougal, Self-Defense, supra note 161, at
597-98.
175. See supra note 84.
176. See MacDonald, How to Wreck the Environment, in UNLESS PEACE COMES: A Scl-
ENTIFiC FORECAST OF NEW WEAPONS 181 (N. Calder ed. 1968) (discussion of environmental
manipulation and coercion).
177. ENVIRONMENTAL WARFARE 87 (A. Westing ed. 1984).
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havior when openly and thoroughly informed of scientific evidence by an
eminent technological nation, which evidence a reasonable person would
find substantial grounds for belief that such behavior significantly in-
creases the likelihood of disastrous effects consequent to the conjunction
of the three Box H elements. 178 Further, if the Treaty's definition of "en-
vironmental modification techniques" is accepted, a circuit is completed
that may justify, under the Treaty, international coercive actions to pre-
vent such disasters as the hypothetical embraces. "Environmental modi-
fication technique" refers to any technique for changing, through the
"deliberate manipulation" of natural processes, the dynamics, composi-
tion, or structure of space or earth, including its atmosphere, lithosphere,
hydrosphere, and biota. 179 Certainly, Box H-exacerbating activities, such
as the deforestation the hypothetical posits, constitute direct and "delib-
erate manipulation" of natural processes. Though the meaning of "delib-
erate" must imply a conscious and purposeful act, having as the intended
purpose something other than the actual effects does not remove the act
from the ambit of "deliberate manipulation."
Additionally, Principle 21 of the Report of the U.N. Conference on the
Human Environment, commonly known as the Stockholm Declaration
on the Human Environment,180 declares,
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the
principle of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own re-
sources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the responsibility
to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause dam-
age to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of na-
tional jurisdiction. 181
The injurious activity in the hypothetical lies squarely within the scope of
the latter part of the Principle. Furthermore, Principle 26 states that
humankind must be spared from nuclear "and all other means of mass
destruction." It does not require that the destruction be either intended
or immediate. Perhaps this document, too, is one further panel in the
quilt of treaties that may cover the technological actor with the appear-
ance of legal justification.
In sum, "self-defense" is a word historically used in an international
context. It has had certain mutable meanings to justify certain policy
178. Implicit in the objective test for an "eminent technological nation" is the assumption
that pre-existing technological capacities in diverse areas allow the more rapid achievement of
expeitise in a wide variety of subjects on which significant resources are only recently focused.
179. EnMod Treaty, supra note 84, at art. II. See generally ENVIRONMENTAL WARFARE,
supra note 177.
180. Report of the U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, supra note 70.
181. Id. at 1420 (emphasis added). Cf. U.N. Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of
States, supra note 155, at art. 30 ("[T]he protection, preservation and enhancement of the
environment for the present and future generations is the responsibility of all States.").
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goals. But the term, and the image it conveys, should not be abandoned
to the ordinary evolution of the language. It should have a meaning that
encompasses the relevant dangers of the present day. Provided such a
reconceptualization occurs, a "self-defense" argument may legitimate ac-
tions taken to address Box H problems.
c. International Concern and Human Rights: Existing Norms
Rather than addressing only the actual damage to be sustained by the
acting country and its future citizens, current norms like those incorpo-
rating international human rights indicate that certain events occurring
within the territory of one state may have multiple transnational ramifi-
cations. Actions of a target country that precipitate major deprivations
of the welfare of those both within and beyond its borders can be deemed
to internationalize jurisdiction.18 2
As two scholars have stated: "If states were to be permitted to impede
the organized community's efforts to rectify situations by claims that ac-
tivities, however threatening, are immune from inclusive concern because
they are within domestic jurisdiction, the principal purpose for which the
whole constitutive structure is established and maintained could be easily
defeated."' 8 3 Any matter originating in one state with significant trans-
frontier injurious effects may become a matter of "international con-
cern," permitting measures ordinarily foregone in deference to sovereign
immunity.' 84
This assertion that state responsibility coexists with state sovereignty
necessarily redefines and limits the latter. This line of reasoning can be
traced back at least as far as the drafting of the U.N. Charter. The his-
tory of article 2(7), for example, refers to "matters which are essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state."'1 5 The drafters of the
clause settled on "essentially," after considering "solely," because they
recognized that in the modern world it was not easy to find any matter
that was solely domestic. 8 6 This made the text particularly versatile
182. McDougal & Reisman, Rhodesia and the United Nations The Lawfulness of Interna-
tional Concern, 62 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 15 (1968).
183. Id. at 14.
184. Id.
185. L. GOODRICH, E. HAMBRO & A. SIMMONS, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS:
COMMENTARY AND DOCUMENTS 60 (3d ed. 1969).
186. Id. at 63. "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Na-
tions to intervene in matters which re essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any
state. . . ." U.N. CHARTER, art. 2(7). It is worth noting that the move from "solely" to
"essentially" might have been a double-edged sword. If the United Nations would have been
forbidden from intervening in that group of X matters "solely" within a state's domestic juris-
diction, and by this article is instead forbidden from intervening in that group of Y matters
"essentially" within that same state's domestic jurisdiction, the state's sovereign envelope is
extended if Y > X. If on the other hand, that group of X things earlier viewed as "solely"
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since it is capable of evolving as the state of the world, and the unavoida-
ble interdependence of the world, makes necessary and appropriate. The
continuing attention to the establishment of international human rights,
which began with the 1945 San Francisco Conference of the United Na-
tions, is a concrete manifestation and mobilization of "international con-
cern."'187 This has, over time, stripped sovereigns of their formerly
exclusive claim to rights in international law, and has eviscerated the
very notion that states are sovereign entities properly impermeable to ex-
ternally prevailing conceptions of appropriate government. 188 The early
formulation of intervention for the provision of basic human rights
sought to characterize the action as one essentially retaliatory for the
damaging effects that the knowledge and observance of human degrada-
tion in a foreign state had on the actor's own populace. 189 Yet; there is a
growing acceptance of the legitimacy of altruistic justifications as well.
The precise meaning of international concern remains hidden and ex-
tremely complex, however, since the right to be concerned about some-
thing is distinct from the right to do something about it.
The United Nations Universal Declaration on Human Rights, 190
which seems to establish that certain coercive actions may be accepta-
ble,19 ' has fairly consistently been interpreted not to constitute an illegal
or illegitimate infringement of the national sovereignty of member
within the state's jurisdiction is now viewed as predominantly composed of matters merely
"essentially" within that state's jurisdiction, then X is effectively relabeled as Y, and the sover-
eign has lost exclusive control over matters previously controlled exclusively. The latter view
appears to have prevailed, and the taxonomic change reflects an important practical and philo-
sophical one. I am indebted to Joseph Tsai for discussion establishing the significance of this
ambiguity.
187. See generally HUMANrrARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS (R. Lil-
lich ed. 1973); Lilich, Forcible Self-Help by States to Protect Human Rights, 53 IoWA L. REV.
325 (1967); - LILLICH & 1. NEWMAN, INTERNATIONAL HuMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF
LAW AND POLICY (1979).
188. Indeed one commentator states that "[g]ross violations of human rights are now con-
sidered to be matters of international rather than domestic concern." Sohn, The New Interna-
tional Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather than States, 32 AM. U.L. REV. 1, 7
(1982); Franek & Rodley, After Bangladesh. The Law of Humanitarian Intervention by Mili-
tary Force, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 275 (1973). This change, if true, marks the beginning of the
"radical" notion of justifiable intervention for semi-altruistic purposes, a notion this paper
seeks to accelerate.
189. See Bilder, supra note 119, at 75. But see the then somewhat anomalous and ground-
breaking view of E. BORCHARD, THE DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD 14
(1916) ("Where a state under exceptional circumstances disregards certain rights of its own
citizens, over whom presumably it has absolute sovereignty, the other states of the family of
nations are authorized by international law to intervene on grounds of humanity.").
190. U.N. Declaration on Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doe. A/
810, at 71.
191. See U.N. CHARTER, art. 42, which states that the Security Council "may take such
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states.192 Emphatically, however, it remains unresolved whether the
U.N. Charter permits a state to commence military intervention within
another state for the reason of safeguarding its own citizens, or the local
population, from gross violations of human rights. 193 Many scholars and
U.N. statements condemn unilateral humanitarian intervention.
194
On the other hand, some scholars read Article 2(4) narrowly, exempt-
ing from prohibition such humanitarian intervention as either a species
of self-defense, or as an act not directly against the "territorial integrity
or political independence" of the offending state.195 Criticism of military
intervention to overthrow the brutal Pol Pot regime in Cambodia, for
example, was not unanimous.1 96 Senator George McGovern of the
United States, for example, had previously, publicly, and explicitly called
for an international military intervention to halt the "clear case of geno-
cide" in Cambodia and to "knock this regime out of power." 197 Nor did
unified criticism attend the Tanzanians' violent overthrow of Amin's re-
gime in Uganda. 198 But praise was not forthcoming either. The Tanzani-
ans somehow expected plaudits for their actions as an instrument of
righteousness, and waited befuddled as the world waffled. Despite the
past cruelty of Amin, world leaders feared the Pandoran consequences
that any approval of the Tanzanian action would portend.
192. Delbruek, International Protection of Human Rights and State Sovereignty, 57 IND. L.
J. 567, 571 (1982). "As early as 1947 the United Nations General Assembly took issue with
the violation of human rights in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania. The Franco regime in
Spain was next on the agenda and so was the question of the treatment of the colored popula-
tion of South Africa.... France was also indicted for human rights violations in Algeria. In
all these cases the General Assembly would not yield to claims of the member state concerned
that the questions raised were those subject to their exclusive national jurisdiction.... It is
established... that the principle of nonintervention does not apply to questions of human
rights violations, although the lawful range of measures to be taken against such violations is
open to discussion." Id. at 571-72.
193. Sohn, supra note 188, at 7-8.
194. Numerous U.N. members, for example, condemned India's intervention to protect
the Bengalis in East Pakistan in 1971. The United States invasion of Grenada, justified as a
hybrid of self-defense and humanitarian intervention, was similarly condemned by the United
Nations and many of the usual U.S. supporters.
195. Reisman, Humanitarian Intervention to Protect the Ibos, reprinted in HUMANrTA-
RLAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNrrED NATIONS App. A (R. Lillich ed. 1973) (written with
the collaboration of Prof. McDougal; originally a petition to the United Nations in 1968).
196. Some sources suggest that the Pol Pot regime was responsible for over a million
deaths. See, e.g., R. GASTL, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD: POLmcAL RIGHTS AND CIVIL
LIBERTIES 253 (1979).
197. McGovern Backs Anti-Cambodian Action, Wash. Post, Aug. 22, 1978, at Al, col. 3;
McGovern and Cambodia: "Old Shock Technique," Wash. Post, Aug. 26, 1978, at A8, col. 1;
Phnom Penh Falls, Wash. Post, Jan. 9, 1979, at A18, col. 1.
198. It is estimated that 500,000 people were killed during Amin's eight-year rule. Wash.
Post, May 6, 1981, at A31, col. 1. See also AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1978 89-92
(1979); AMNESTY INTERNAToNAL REPORT 1977 109-12 (1977).
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d. Application of Existing Norms to the Hypothetical
In the context of Box H threats, motives for intervention are of neces-
sity semi-altruistic rather than wholly so, but this does not negate the
added impetus to action that international concern brings. Scholarly
analysis of these incidents has suggested that, in addition to the two pre-
requisites also existing for self-defense claims (exhaustion of peaceful
means and immediacy of danger), forceful humanitarian intervention re-
quires: i) a specific purpose of remedying the human rights situation in
that territory, ii) minimum force necessary for that purpose, iii) force
limited in purpose, time, and scope, and iv) truly massive violations. 199
The problem in seeking to slip a coercive response to the hypothetical
beneath the protective blanket of international human rights is primarily
with the last of the four criteria. The hypothetical, and Box H problems
in general, are problems precisely because there is time-lag between ac-
tions and effects, thus massive violations may be hard to identify. Fur-
thermore, establishing proximate cause poses a far greater obstacle here
than when observing genocide or torture. Nonetheless, the concept of
international concern is a valuable one, since some issues that were his-
torically of purely domestic jurisdiction are so no longer. The Permanent
Court of International Justice, in the Tunis-Morocco case,200 for exam-
ple, compellingly argued that certain issues could be internationalized
depending upon the entire configuration of then-prevailing international
relations. The efficacy and ultimate necessity of regulating transgressive
policies in foreign states (even before the accumulation of massive viola-
tions) is simply the next conceptual interval of internationalization. One
cannot logically extract, for example, environment-threatening activities
from that zone of concern that attends to human dignity and human
rights. Rather, it is the penumbra of sovereign rights that must contract
sufficiently to expose environmentally deleterious policies to environmen-
tally conservatory policing.
Quite simply, then, the "entire configuration" has changed, making
necessary an extension of international jurisdiction to Box H issues.
Originally, the destructive capabilities of elites were so insignificant that
acts of states were not considered "international delinquencies," no mat-
199. Levitin, The Law of Force and the Force of Law: Grenada, the Falklands, and Hu-
manitarian Intervention, 27 HARV. INTL' L.J. 621, 652-53 (1986).
200. Advisory Opinion on the Tunis-Morocco Nationality Decrees, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B)
No. 4, 7 (Feb. 7). In 1921 Tunis and Morocco enacted legislation that would have ascribed
Tunisian or Moroccan nationality to individuals Britain claimed as subjects. Id. at 21. Asked
for an advisory opinion on whether the matter of nationality is "solely a matter of domestic
jurisdiction," the Court stated that "the question whether a certain matter is or is not solely
within the jurisdiction of a State is an essentially relative question; it depends upon the devel-
opment of international relations." Id. at 24.
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ter how harmful they were to another state.201 With increasing destruc-
tive capacity, international concern grew to prevail over domestic
jurisdiction when external resources, like oceans, were involved.20 2 But
with internal resources and purely internal activities, the conflict en-
dures. One scholarly work notes that states continue to assert rights
eliminating any international inclusive competence over their internal re-
sources, and yet it seems increasingly evident that the exclusive compe-
tence of domestic governments over the exploitation of some internal
resources is unacceptable when the effects are extraterritorial and con-
cern the welfare, and even security, of the larger community.20 3 The
plethora of material, from national, regional, and global organizations, as
well as private organizations, and the global acceptance of conventions
embodying strict liability for space activities and nuclear damage and
certain pollution, reveal the development of community expectations.
2
04
Yet current international norms prohibit any involvement of extraterrito-
rial authorities until issues of compensation arise, that is, until value dep-
rivation has already occurred.20 5 This is irrational for the genre' of
problem that the hypothetical illuminates.
One major problem with the current approach is merely a function of
an obsolete conception of classification. In the past, a state had exclusive
control over resources within its borders. Things flowing through, like
rivers, were to some extent shared resources. When confronted with the
problems of the hypothetical, one constructive approach would be to rec-
ognize that the trees of a country, for example, may currently be taxo-
nomically internal, but effectively shared. The appropriate international
reaction seems quite different if they are viewed as the equivalent of a
vertical river, flowing upwards to the atmosphere, the disruption of
which should result in accountability.
201. L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 343 (H. Lauterpacht 8th ed. 1955); see also
ARSANANi, supra note 155, at 394.
202. ARSANJANI, supra note 155, at 8-9.
203. Id. at 8-9; see, e.g., article 10 of the International Law Association's Helsinki Rules
on the Use of the Waters of International Rivers, Report of the Fifty-Second Congress, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/ser.A/Add.I, at 477, 496-97 (1980).
204. There has been an increased concern, reflected in quite a number of conventions and
conferences, about controlling injurious use of certain internal resources. For an analysis of
these, see ARSANJANI, supra note 155, ch. 5 (concerning oceans, waterways, and air pollution)
and the recent Montreal Protocol, supra note 87, regarding chloroflorocarbons.
Mikhail Gorbachev's Dec. 7, 1988 address to the United Nations symbolized growing con-
cern as it proposed a U.N. center for emergency environmental assistance and an orbiting
space station designed exclusively for monitoring the state of the environment. So, too, did
ABC's Sept. 12, 1989 "Capitol to Capitol" broadcast, which linked legislators from Moscow,
Brasilia, London, and Washington to discuss environmental affairs. See The Gorbachev Visit:
The Problem of Mankind's Survival, N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 1988, at A16, col. 1.
205. ARSANJAm, supra note 155, at 391.
263
Yale Journal of International Law
An additional obstacle remains, however, with the concept of interna-
tional concern. The term, as frequently used, appears to contemplate the
involvement and common concern of a number of politically relevant
states. Yet Box H crises and disparities in scientific sophistication must
preempt the need for happy agreement among a large number of nations;
the majority vote of global neighbors cannot mystically commute supe-
rior numbers into a claim of superior understanding. If a technological
actor is convinced that the concerns of all are implicated, it should act
coercively, perhaps injunctively, and justify retroactively.
20 6
B. An Extra-Legal Justification of Unilateral State Action
Beyond self-defense and international concern, it is possible to justify
unilateral action as an effort to ensure the welfare of others, both those
currently existing and those yet to come. Admittedly, a doctrine of inter-
national civil disobedience, or the moral obligation of global guardian-
ship, has not yet evolved. 20 7 Nevertheless, if earlier arguments prove
unsuccessful in illuminating an appropriate response to Box H problems,
it is still arguable that a firm belief in the overwhelming necessity of the
act justifies action. This justification is, essentially, an acknowledgement
that certain issues are more fundamental than the then existing climate of
elite expectations (current law), which necessarily lags behind new devel-
opments in individual, social, and political values.
Marked deviation from the trajectory of international norm expecta-
tions and formulations must be rooted in obligations and rights that flow
therefrom. Clearly, at the logical extreme, the abstract moment just
before the threshold of irreversibility is reached invokes both obligations
and rights and its implications are justification enough to suspend the
"rules" of the game. It is fine that we are all fish in an aquarium, estab-
lishing various principles of how and when we swim, and in which direc-
tion. But an obsession with creating or preserving order is irrelevant
when someone swims toward the glass carelessly brandishing a glass-cut-
ter.208 Thus when the most technologically advanced country becomes
206. If other elites may be convinced post hoc, having had their attentions focused by the
willingness of the technological actor to intervene, then the action is, de facto, international-
ized. Should the other elites remain unconvinced, either no significant sanction will befall the
initial actor, or any sanction imposed will necessarily be of lesser cost than that which the
actor believes would be the long-term costs of not acting.
207. See, Bilder, supra note 119, at 78-79. Bilder's article does not address unilateral ac-
tion within another state's jurisdiction, but rather principally addresses exemplary and non-
interventionist activity.
208. Indeed, at such a point even the sanctity of life must give way before the sanctity of,
what has been named of the yet hospitable globe, the "carrying capacity." The term refers to
the maximum strain a stable system can endure. See Human Ecology: The Subversive Con-
servative Science, 25 AM. ZOOLOGIST 469 (1985).
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convinced that that point is rapidly approaching (although it is clearly
beyond plausibility that the last pre-threshold moment and the moment
predicted to be such will be identical), a moral obligation to attempt to
rectify the matter is created, as well as an enabling right to do so, com-
pletely irrespective of possible normative sanctions. The obligation de-
rives from the value (increased proportionally as the affected members
and magnitude of effects climb) of preventing second-party uninten-
tional, self-inflicted harm as well as needless and simultaneous injury to
innocent others. Emphatically, this obtains even if the costs incurred via
inaction were to accrue primarily to the account of future generations.
Other extra-legal and necessary justifications that should rise to the level
of legal requirements will correspond to criteria for assessment proposed
below.
VI. Consequences
Having chosen the method of justification, what are the possible conse-
quences of the technological actor's unilateral act of coercion? Several
possible reactions to the use of force to combat a Box H problem, regard-
less of pre-action expectations, might ensue: members of the global com-
munity will either i) support it; ii) remain silent, acquiescing; iii) protest
the act (orally, forcefully, or one following the other); iv) imitate the act;
or v) engage in some combination of the above. The oral protest element
is likely to consist of arguments that the act i) is without legal justifica-
tion; ii) disrupts the international order; iii) is capable of commencing
globe-threatening escalation; iv) asserts a right subject to abuse; v) vio-
lates various legal principles and treaties (most significantly, those re-
specting state sovereignty); and vi) engenders major economic, political,
cultural, and legal ramifications. Certainly there is cause for community
concern; under the pretext of defending self or global interests, freedom
may be suppressed, and democratic institutions may be destroyed. Many
totalitarian regimes cloak oppression, for example, behind the rhetoric of
the "greater good." It is appropriate for other countries to feel vulnera-
ble. Quite simply, quis custodiens ipsos custodes? 20 9
Yet powerful states have always been capable of violating international
obligations. They may do so with impunity, or they may pay a price.
But it must be recognized that there are already existing inhibitions to
order-disruption. Powerful states, too, have a stake in stability and an
209. "Who shall guard the guardians themselves?"
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acute sense of countervailing power.210 This article cannot possibly ex-
plore the myriad political and economic ramifications caused by coercive
acts. Suffice it to say that the situation is indeed complex, but that com-
plexity does not indicate that the best course of action is inaction. A time
comes when it is appropriate to act unilaterally rather than to attempt
multilateral action that is, even if politically preferable, too late.
VII. Non-Governmental Organizations: Action and Assessment
Thus far we have considered only governmental action. Two related
issues must be addressed: Who else may act? and Who else may contain?
Ordinarily, states have proved jealous of their relative monopoly on rep-
resentative actions, and have sought to restrict or regulate individual ini-
tiative in the constitutive process.211 Yet in the face of Box H threats, to
NGOs belongs the domain and special responsibility of both action and
reaction. Private organizations acting independently to affect govern-
ments, or with the indirect guidance or aid of a government, can exert
considerable pressure directly to influence transgressive countries. Yet
because of their non-affiliation with states proper, they can and should
also be extremely valuable in aiding the appreciation, assessment, action,
and constant evaluation of Box H problems and actions to address them.
This assessment function is critically important because it may be all that
contains otherwise uncheckable manipulation by powerful countries.
Assessment by NGOs should therefore be both an advisable exercise and
a necessary feature of truly justifiable coercive acts.
A. Role as Actor
While governments are generally considered to be the significant forces
of history, careful scrutiny of the demonstrated potential of NGOs
reveals international networks as a potential force not to be underesti-
mated. 212 Examples of international organizations without government
affiliation include cartels, certain newspapers, religious, ethnic, and class
210. See generally Schachter, Armed Force, supra note 108. Given the existing decentral-
ized international arena, there may be no greater authority, no higher guardian, than an indi-
vidual state. While response to Box H problems may appear disruptive of the international
order, it attempts to preserve the minimum existing conditions necessary to give the concept of
order meaning. It is patently irrational to exalt intellectually elite concepts of order and fair-
ness over minimal global stability and, perhaps, survival.
211. Constitutive Process, supra note 5, at 191, 223.
212. See generally R. WHrE, INTERNATIONAL NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
(1951); J. LADOR-LEDERER, INTERNATIONAL NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AND
ECONOMIC.'ENTITIES (1963); Reisman, Sanctions and Enforcement [hereinafter Reisman,
Sanctions], in 3 THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 273, 316-17 (C. Black
& R. Falk eds. 1971).
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pressure groups, as well as such entities as the International Red Cross,
or, in the subject of the hypothetical, Greenpeace International and
"Earth First!" A number of NGOs exist that are capable of significant
impact, and probably symbolic of a wide variety of NGOs available to
aid in resolving Box H problems of diverse subjects. Greenpeace Inter-
national, for example, founded by one man in the early 1970s,- grew from
1.4 million members and $24 million in revenues in 1985 to over 3.3
million members worldwide with 33 offices in 20 countries and revenues
estimated at $100 million in 1989.213 Few organizations have equalled
such growth when accepting no corporate or government grants. With a
fleet of eight ocean-going ships, all patched in to a sophisticated elec-
tronic network by means of satellite communications equipment, Green-
peace continues to expand its international presence and support.214 Its
reputation for non-violent but head-to-head confrontation has secured
Greenpeace attention in many hundreds of articles chronicling daring
and startling operations. 215 The formula of brazen actions and high pub-
licity is credited with such effects and policy alterations as decreased seal
and whale-hunting, as well as government closures of industrial plants.
216
Anyone doubting the practical commotion an NGO can create might do
well to consider why the French government, risking reputation as well
as lives, bombed and destroyed Greenpeace's vessel, "Rainbow War-
rior," in New Zealand in 1985.217
One might fruitfully consider at least nine variations of direct meas-
ures available that should be explored by both NGOs and the populace of
the technological actor when confronted by a Box H problem. First, and
most obviously, NGOs can be extremely effective in mobilizing popular
support for an issue. NGOs can succeed, through the media, in focusing
attention on a transgressive country, and thereby exerting significant in-
direct pressure upon the political structure there. Amnesty International
and various animal rights groups have had remarkable success in this
role.
Second, NGOs can be instrumental in exerting financial pressure (al-
beit minimal) upon the economy of a transgressive country. Such actions
include organizing domestic boycotts of certain imported products, and
213. Norton, Green Giant, Wash. Post, Sept. 3, 1989 (magazine), at 24, 26.
214. It recently opened new offices and bases in Latin America, Antarctica, and Moscow.
Id.
215. For example, 1) maneuvering dinghies directly into the line of fire of harpoons used
by Japanese whalers, 2) handcuffing members to toxic waste drums about to be dumped at sea,
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encouraging a reduction in profits reaped from tourism within the trans-
gressive country.
Third, NGOs can focus popular pressure upon domestic organizations
that provide services or goods to the transgressive country. The number
of corporations and municipalities that have wholly or partially divested
of South African investments is a testament to the potential effectiveness
of these measures.
Fourth, the same popular support can be focused upon the executive
branch of the NGO's own country (or countries), exerting pressure for it
to act in any way contemplated in the sections discussing governmental
action herein.
Fifth, NGOs may motivate certain constituencies that can urge the
legislature to regulate certain activities of the executive in its interna-
tional relations. This influence can take the form of anything from low-
level economic sanctions to non-recognition. 218 NGOs may also en-
courage legislation that regulates the business activities of certain domes-
tic organizations providing services to the target country.
Sixth, NGOs can work with international organizations to heighten
awareness and foster the financial, political, or moral support of foreign
governments and peoples.
Seventh, as the international equivalent of the fifth method, NGOs
can, in their respective countries, encourage simultaneous and function-
ally identical legislation that might specify circumstances or timetables
under which activities of various levels of coercion are to be
implemented.
Eighth, NGOs may take direct non-violent action themselves. While
this possibility does not frequently occur to theorists and remains contro-
versial, it is a practical and not uncommon phenomenon. Greenpeace, to
give a concrete example in the context of the hypothetical, is an NGO
routinely organized to engage in nonviolent physical interference with
such activities as whaling and ocean dumping. Carrying "interference" a
little further, and in contrast to the explosive growth and massive cam-
paigns of Greenpeace, Earth First! has grown since its founding 10 years
ago to only 500 people. Yet the media coverage it receives is extraordi-
nary. In addition to sponsoring such activities as dropping banners from
the Colorado Capital, handcuffing themselves to bulldozers, and demon-
strating all over the country at offices and logging and uranium mining
218. Indirectly, the government can encourage the activities of NGOs by manipulating tax
incentives, or by adopting a laissez-faire attitude vis d vis the direct action of NGOs, discussed
as the eighth and ninth variations immediately below.
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sites, Earth First! engages in eco-sabotage: the damage and disruption of
tools, processes, or results of environmentally injurious activities. 219
Finally, while the least coercive and least destructive methods neces-
sary to be effective are always preferable, it is not possible to address,
logically and thoroughly, all the NGO alternatives without consideration
of violence. Although we tend to regard the ability to create and deploy
armed forces as a matter exclusively within the province of sovereigns,
both the historical and current incidence and existence of secret or mer-
cenarily motivated specialists in violence is not uncommon. 220 The
Haganah, the Irish Republican Army, and Al Fatah are examples of
such privately funded non-state armies.221 Unofficial, private groups like
these have long had a violent role in international, as well as internal,
affairs. Such "private armiis 222 commonly do not represent a broad-
based governmental or popular support, and consequently exercise spo-
radic powers. 223 Nonetheless, as some commentators have noted, the ac-
tivities of private armies are not necessarily disruptive, since out of
anarchy they may contribute to "stabilized disorder." 224 It may be that
stabilized disorder, rather than accelerating entropy, is precisely the best
the world can offer to confront a Box H problem.225
B. Role as Assessor
Given the disturbing conclusion that in Box H circumstances coercion
may be the only effective response, some criteria for assessment of legiti-
macy is critical. Suppose, for the moment, that the leaders of a country
219. When negotiations fail, it advocates "monkey-wrenching" tactics that include spiking
radiators, putting sugar in gas tanks, spiking trees, and forcefully deconstructing logging vehi-
cles. Though aggressively "nonviolent," the group has succeeded in drawing attention to itself
by temporarily shutting down various logging operations, and dumping large stumps and saw-
dust in the Portland office of Senator Hatfield to protest his legislation that would prohibit
judicial review of United States Forest Service logging plans.
220. Reisman, Sanctions, supra note 212, at 317 n.135. This is particularly true in the Far
East and Africa.
221. Id.
222. Reisman, Private Armies in a Global War System: Prologue to Decision, 14 VA. J.
INT'L L. 1, 2 (1973). Professor Reisman defines an army as "a corps of people, sharing loyalty
to a common symbol, skilled in the manual of arms and operating within a command structure
one of whose manifest functions is to direct corps members or 'soldiers' in the purposive exer-
cise of violence." Id at 1. He stresses that this definition is intended to sever the term from the
popular contemporary connotation according to which an army must be associated with a
territorial entity.
223. Some such states are treated as nation-states as a result of "the tacit or express agree-
ment or the coincidental disinterest of the effective global elites." Id at 5.
224. Id. at 7 (citing Wolf & Hansen, Caudillo Politics: A Structural Analysis, 9 CoNT.
STUD. Soc. & Hisr. 168-69 (1967)). Cf. "One man's terrorism is another man's freedom
fighting."
225. If such is the case, it may be that even those states with rigorous domestic controls
may indirectly aid the goal of such violent NGOs by refusing to curtail their activities.
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have announced a program gradually to increase coercion, or actually
commence such a program to achieve the cessation of a particular activ-
ity pursued by foreign nationals; their allegations of Box H resound, self-
righteously. Given that the justification for such action relies on a claim
of the necessity of swift, effective decision and a claim to at least tempo-
rarily superior access to understanding the pieces of the Box H puzzle,
what can operate to contain or check this new justification for coercion?
Having just created a theoretical basis for justifiable coercion, what is to
prevent this from becoming a battle flag of the imperialist, or those ad-
vantaged countries seeking to preserve the status quo? To increase justi-
fication, such coercive action requires the technological actor to develop
a method of appraising the severity, and magnitude of the alleged Box H
problem, and a deliberative process, using a set of criteria designed to
maximize the government's collective self-reflection and accountability
without paralyzing its responsiveness. Ideally, the government involved
should set in motion an independent procedure by which the policies and
actions may be assessed. Obviously, the more inclusive the actor is in its
decision making, the more legitimate its action will appear. (This entails
sharing knowledge and constructively engaging the response, while re-
serving the executive decision.) Failing this, independently conceived or-
ganizations, NGOs, may fulfill the identical function. While actors and
assessors can both be NGOs, however, it is important to recognize that
not every NGO can be both actor and assessor. Those NGOs most effec-
tive in action will be those who have already assessed, while those NGOs
most effective as assessors may be so precisely because they have not yet
acted. It will be the respbnsibility of those not the target of the decision
to coerce to appraise the initial cogency as well as the ongoing validity,
actual accuracy, and appropriateness of the claim and the action. If pub-
lic and articulate, such appraisal may inhibit the actors from initiating
actions at inappropriately low levels of certainty. The following outline
briefly explores a number of criteria that may be employed in appraisal.
None individually is terribly complex, but all, in the aggregate, are of
vital importance
This system of appraisal is essentially a means of assessing success and
imposing responsibility for abuse of power.226 It is a process of cautious
but not overbearing containment and post hoe evaluation, in which bol-
stering the latter may aid the former.
I Acquisition
A) Has there been rigorous collection of data?
226. See generally Constitutive Process, supra note 5, at 285-86.
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B) Is the data highly reliable?
C) Has there been clear, open, public, and prior presentation of
evidence?
II. Analysis and Assessment
A) Who is involved, and with what qualifications?
227
B) Has there been involvement of qualified, non-government individ-
uals, including the solicitation and participation of national issue-
specific non-governmental organizations?
C) Has the behavior objected to been specifically identified and
clearly articulated?
D) Is the range of probabilities that the posited Box H problem is
indeed a factual possibility significantly high?
228
E) If more than one country is a contributor to the problem, were
rational standards used to select the single or several target coun-
tries as principal contributors?
F) Has there been, and will there continue to be, sustained scrutiny
and reassessment of possible combinations, sequences, and de-
grees of intensity of the four tools of international influence: the
diplomatic, the ideological, the economic, and the military?
229
G) Have there been efforts to study post-action effects and their
duration?
H) Has the past trend in motivations and actions of the leaders of the
technological country been reasonably nonexpansionist?
I) How plausible are the possibilities of alternative motivations (e.g.,
reprisal, resource acquisition, etc.)?
III Sacrifice
A) Public Efforts.
1) Has there been investment of time and resources in high pro-
file public communiques (e.g., to the domestic public, the
U.N., etc.) and simultaneous efforts to share scientific tech-
niques, data, and information?
2) Have there been attempts to negotiate with target countries?
3) Have there been attempts to create swift and serious interna-
tional attention to the previously shared data and offending
countries' actions?
227. For an examination of the separate problem of how governments can assess technol-
ogy, see Politics, Technology and Technology Assessment, supra note 30.
228. Although the "significantly high" standard must be a subjective one, it is probably
advisable that the percentage of certainty need not be very high. Though extreme, an example
may illustrate: Russian roulette involves a 1/6 % chance that the one bullet is in one of the six
chambers. Nevertheless, this small risk is "significantly high" enough to prompt most to act to
avoid taking that chance. Clearly, an alarming percentage is a function of the gravity of the
harm.
229. See M. McDOUGAL & W. M. REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY
PERSPECTIVE: THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE WORLD COMMUNITY chs. 7-10 (1981).
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4) Has there been a reasonable amount of time, considering the
rapidity of the problem's advance, for target countries to as-
sess the shared information and settlement proposals?
B) Cleaning House.
1) Has there been strict scrutiny of the technological actor's ef-
forts to assess its own current contribution to the problem, if
any?
2) Have there been swift efforts to address and curtail its own
contribution to the problem, if any?
C) Willingness to Commit Resources.
1) Has there been voluntary sacrifice of receivables?
2) Have there been direct subsidies (in the form of money, goods,
technology, personnel, and technical advisors) to aid target
countries in examining and addressing the activity in question,
formulating alternative plans, and instituting them?
230
D) Willingness to Take Responsibility.
Has there been a manifested and unwavering willingness to take
responsibility and a firm conviction in the cause?
IV Commitment to Minimization
A) Have there been obvious and effective measures to prevent collat-
eral benefit to the actor, both nationally and individually, in eco-
nomic, political, or strategic rewards?
B) Has there been an awareness of context, an attempt not to employ
far greater coercion than necessary?
C) Has there been attention to the amelioration of target country
loss?
D) Have there been evident efforts to minimize dogma and ideologi-
cal imposition attendant to the coercion?
E) Have there been efforts to minimize the duration of coercive
measures?
230. A good illustration is President Johnson's offer of aid in development to North Viet-
nam, see supra note 127. See also Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. Rlv. 1089 (1972). The Calabresian
framework suggests four theoretical approaches: i) the offending country reimburses the rest
of the world for the injury it creates in continuing its extraterritorially injurious activity; ii)
the offending country has an immutable right to continue its activity without interference or
liability, and such right may be purchased as property by the technological actor; iii) the
technological actor compensates the offending country for the amount by which it is damaged
by ceasing its activities with extraterritorially injurious effects; iv) the technological actor has
an absolute right to prevent the offending country from continuing its damaging activities. As
a purely practical matter, the first possibility is impractical and contradictory (as lesser tech-
nology and wealth tend to be inversely related) and the second is impossible in the context of
Box H. The possibility mentioned in the text above, which is that of the third category, begins
with such things as debt for environment swaps and transmutes to the fourth category as the
perceived gravity of the harm increases.
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VIII. Conclusion
The development of science in the long run is incompatible with the exist-
ence of sovereign nation-states.231
Science, which engendered the possibility of problems uniquely joining
the elements of i) irreversibility, ii) universality, and iii) time-lag between
action and effect, has essentially been confined by the'anthropocentric
fears, frailties, and ignorance of the human mind to a role that allows it
to create, but not effectively to warn or guide. It is divorced from the
domestic and international sociopolitical/legal arena. No less signifi-
cantly, as analysis of a hypothetical Box H problem reveals, there are
enormous barriers to any multilateral international cooperation that
could effectively address the uniquely juxtaposed elements science may
recognize. Analysis of the Box H hypothetical highlights the fundamen-
tal incapacity of our political, social, and legal systems to pass between
the Scylla of haste and the Charybdis of insufficiently responsive action.
Because of the cacophony of cultural and economic norms and expecta-
tions, mere institutional and multilateral reforms are not only unlikely,
but unavoidably ineffective in dealing with irreversible, global, and in-
tensely time-sensitive crises. This compels the realization that limits
should apply to the exaltation of order over sense. Discerning this, the
technological actor should initially act to address any contribution to the
problem it, itself, is making, and then pursue plurilateral efforts, or the
aid of.non-governmental organizations, either as supplemental or alter-
native possibilities. Nevertheless, it is manifestly unclear that even these
can be quickly mobilized or effective.
If unilateral actions are ultimately necessary and initiated, problems of
legalizing, legitimating, and containing coercion will arise. The dispari-
ties of scientific knowledge among international actors suggest that docu-
mentary sources of law, which appear to prohibit all coercion, may
usefully be reinterpreted to remove from the concept of "aggression" the
parochial qualification of "intended," or even "knowing," infliction of
harm. This conceptual shift appears overdue, given that it is anachronis-
tic to assume, as current international norms do, that events of truly mas-
sive trans-boundary damage occur solely at the intention of the
perpetrator. Responding with coercion to policies of a foreign sovereign
effecting trans-frontier injuries is not then prohibited. Even more signifi-
231. A. BUZZATI-TRAVERSO, THE SCIENTnIc ENTERPRISE, TODAY AND ToMoRRow,
(1977), quoted in R. CLARKE, supra note 56, at 164. But see id., R. 'CLARKE, ch. 10 (examin-
ing the controversy between the view of science as above the boundaries of nation states and
the contrasting view of science as a purely national instrument to further a nation's
development).
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cantly, the time-lag element of Box H problems requires that the concept
of "immediate" harm be removed from the necessary preconditions of
valid self-defense claims. The self-defense argument is further buttressed
by customary international law precedents, such as the norms allowing
anticipatory self-defense in response to international terrorism. Finally,
the growing support for, and precedent of, non-violent and violent meaS-
ures as remedies to international human rights violations illustrate a
growing acceptance, crucial for addressing Box H problems, that "inter-
national concern" may legitimate the extraterritorial use of coercion to
influence policy within the previously sacrosanct borders of a foreign sov-
ereign nation. This series of justification expansions must be balanced by
the specific assessment criteria herein proposed, that may help NGOs
and citizens evaluate and inhibit otherwise unrestrained action when
appropriate.
Quite simply, there are times when principles must either be
subordinated to a goal or brought into line with it. Fabricated concepts
of rights pertaining to sovereignty, jurisdiction, territory, and property
have no greater significance, and engender no greater logical conse-
quence, than a particular international configuration, at one instant in
time, conceives and allows. Ideally, prescriptive and retributive expecta-
tions should adapt to unprecedented problems.
Pursuant to the goal of achieving rapid, effective, and justifiable resolu-
tion of any problems arising in the context of the elements of irreversibil-
ity, universality, and time-lag, the technologically superior countries
must reconceptualize and articulate their roles, the relationship between
science and law, and the legality of coercive actions that may be advisa-
ble to pursue, either in concert with a small number of other countries
and non-governmental organizations or alone. This proposal to expand
the envelope of justifiable intervention should not be enthusiastically em-
braced, only grudgingly adopted as the lesser of evils. But the mere exist-
ence of such a frightening possibility of unilateral intervention may
improve the prospects for more moderate proposals: as noted earlier,
common perception of a threat is the first stage of effective
multilateralism.232
It is quite possible that, as time passes, particular issues of apparent
urgency, like that upon which the hypothetical is loosely based, may fail
232. See generally Falk, Global Environment, supra note 63. Consider also that by impos-
ig a template of national declaration upon the true threat of feedback degradation, the threat
may be in a more immediate, less abstract, and more familiar form. The real issue is not use of
coercion, but willingness to use coercion. An articulated policy often has a magical way of
focusing the mind of all parties.
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to arrive in full force. Yet the genre of problem remains. Any Box H
problem confronting the current international norms will find our cur-
rent international community jointly at the helm of a sailing vessel, pay-
ing more attention to prospects of mutinous struggles within than to the
steadily decreasing depth of the water beneath us. At what depth will
the alarm be sounded? And with what speed can we effect a change of
course - as the winds drive us inexorably on? Certainly, no policy is
truly ideal, but better to have no one guard the guardians than to have no
guardians at all. There is no deus ex machina, and the closest habitable
planet is not nearby.
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